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ABSTRACT
“For the Hope of Humanity:
Gov. Andrew G. Curtin & the Union’s Civil War”
Jared Frederick

This thesis examines the ideology and politics of Andrew Gregg Curtin throughout his
entire career, specifically during his time as the governor of Pennsylvania in the American Civil
War. As a self-described liberal, Curtin’s vision for his state and nation was emblematic of
broader Whig and Republican mentalities before and during the Civil War. Central to his ideas
were notions of contractual theory, a harmony of interests between workers and industrialists,
free labor, the right to property, and the rights of the individual to seek autonomy and agency in a
democratic society. The outbreak of war expanded his sense of liberalism to include factors
dealing not solely with economics but nationalism, emancipation, military welfare, and statesponsored education. In all these areas, Curtin’s emphasis on contract is evident. He demanded
loyalty to the Union but rewarded that behavior as well. In Curtin’s view, the staunch defense of
Union and emancipation were humanitarian endeavors to protect the liberties of the free citizen
as well as tactics to defeat the Confederacy.
The Loyal War Governor’s Conference coordinated by Curtin in 1862 supported
emancipation, Federal troops, and the constitutional and military policies of Abraham Lincoln.
The governor’s efforts in creating the Soldiers’ National Cemetery following the Battle of
Gettysburg in addition to his establishment of veterans’ welfare and state-sponsored orphans’
homes reinforced the sense of partnership between a people and their nation. In the later days of
Reconstruction, Curtin became a moderate Democrat and continued to express concerns over the
protection of free labor and ideas of contract and loyalty. Andrew Curtin’s ideology reflected
classical liberal tendencies but also demonstrated the broader social changes brought about by
the Civil War. Curtin’s ideological journey emphasized the importance of individual liberty and
also reflected the transformation of the Union into a nationalist state grounded in humanitarian
sensibilities.
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1
Introduction
Lincoln’s Shadow
Standing vigilantly over the fields of Gettysburg National Military Park is an impressive
memorial that dominates all others in scale and design. The bronze tablets and majestic features
of the Pennsylvania Memorial include the names of over 30,000 Keystone State men who fought
in the Civil War’s largest and costliest battle. On its massive white pedestals stand the statues of
multiple Pennsylvania generals and Abraham Lincoln—mostly well-known personalities to Civil
War aficionados who frequent the site. But to the Great Emancipator’s left stands the sculpture
of another political leader who is neither well known nor often memorialized—at least in
contemporary society. “Who is Curtin?” inquisitive visitors ask periodically.

The concise

answer to satisfy the rushed tourist denotes Andrew Gregg Curtin as the diligent wartime
governor of Pennsylvania and a staunch supporter of the sixteenth president. To properly answer
this question, however, requires further elaboration.
Pennsylvanians commemorated their war heroes with great vigor, but few of Andrew
Curtin’s early attributes suggested he would become a military notable. He was the son of a
rural industrialist, he was a lawyer, an educator, and a state secretary. Simply put—he was a
bureaucrat. But a distinct and compelling ideology propelled his gubernatorial policies that
ultimately warranted his veneration as a wartime leader. The governor’s philosophy envisioned
a social order in which the people and their state protected each other—especially economically
and militarily. At the beginning of his gubernatorial career in January 1861, Curtin described his
own state policies and aspirations as “liberal in spirit,” embedded in a dual sense of devotion to
the common citizen and the government that presided over all manners of domestic growth. The
ensuing Civil War, launched only three month later, did not shatter this civic marriage between
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the northern people and their Union, but further consolidated and strengthened it to new and
unforeseen levels.
Curtin’s advocacy of a “harmony of interests” between people, business, and the state
eventually surpassed economic motives of labor protection and expanded to reward and
safeguard the renewed rights of loyal citizenry borne through war. 1 While he expanded the
limits of his convictions throughout the conflict, he nevertheless remained constant to his liberalWhig notion of contractual theory: the integral ties between individuals, economy, and
government. While Curtin initially wished to avoid bloodshed, the Civil War ultimately served
as the means through which to defend and enhance liberal principles he and many Republicans
already held dear. Through the lens of his perspectives on secession, emancipation, and soldier
welfare—one can see how his own sense of liberalism personified the widespread ambitions of
many in the North. At the conflict’s outset, Curtin’s liberalism was rooted in the wish to protect
people’s self-making capacity and their private property—even slave property. But as the Civil
War escalated, Curtin thought the state had no option but to assist its most worthy citizens and
soldiers deserving of recognition, care, and defense. These deeds helped transform government
into an activist state invested in promoting humanitarian endeavors. Inclusion in this system
required devotion. An expanded state demanded loyalty but rewarded it as well.
Curtin’s views on secession, discussed in Chapter One, reveal how disunion could
destroy the republic and imperil its citizens. The governor’s creed touted the supremacy of
national government as a cherished keepsake bestowed by the Founders. During the war, Curtin
supported expanding federal authority, including military honors, care for casualties, and statesponsored education. Ultimately, Curtin advocated a new dynamic relationship of shared
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interests the people possessed with their government, and vice versa. Curtin’s responsibility for
the people deemed that government expanded out of necessity to ensure the promises of equality.
One’s loyalty to the nation was in part conveyed through these perceptions of patriotism in
which interdependence was among the highest ideals of Union’s national pact. Dedication was
“a liberal understanding of patriotism” grounded in dual self-interests and sacrifice for the
greater good. 2 Politicians’ liberal policies sought to shield the individual citizen, his family, his
manhood, and his society through the protection of his property. Liberal thought protected and
rewarded what individual soldiers had gained through their successful defense of these rights.
Such convictions assisted in the construction of the nation state and helped foster security
at multiples levels of society. 3 Northerners were emboldened by the dreams of a country moving
forward thanks to the virtues of free labor, enterprise, and good fortune found in few other
nations or empires. Therefore, America was a “democratic beacon” for fellow man; and liberal
thought of the time encouraged such discourse. 4 This principle fostered active representative
government, sponsored educational initiatives, and protected loyalists’ assets. 5 In its most
simplistic definition, liberalism championed the individual freedoms and capacity of citizens so
they could be afforded a level playing field in life but, in return, it required support (and death if
necessary) of its citizens.
Born of a well-to-do industrial family in 1817 and thriving off the manual work of others,
Curtin nevertheless believed in individual liberty—the right to determine one’s own destiny in an
economically fair and developed system. National harmony promoted by shared interests had
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the power to unite a people willing to labor hard for themselves. 6 Curtin believed liberty
required the protection of the republic that endowed these rights. Citizens provided this
protection by supporting the institutions that fostered public growth both morally and financially.
As he stated in an address welcoming President-elect Lincoln to Harrisburg on February 22,
1861, “Our great law-giver and founder established this government of a free people in deeds of
peace. We are a peaceful and laborious people. We believe that civilization, progress, and
Christianity are advanced by the protection of free and paid labor.” 7
Slavery was the antithesis of this dream but, like most Republicans of the day, Curtin was
at first unwilling to engage in warfare to end it. Slavery was an evil contrary to nearly all his
principles, yet he felt the status quo needed to be maintained in the interests of political
harmony—especially when the hopes of reconciliation with seceded states was still considered a
possibility. An imperfect Union was better than no Union at all. Optimists prayed that an olive
branch could be extended to avert war. Still, Curtin believed secession and disunion contradicted
the practice of democracy and majority rule. In his view, these threats posed grave dangers not
only to commerce and national strength, but to the ability of the citizen to determine his own
prospects. Secession jeopardized the Union, posing ominous threats to the political and
economic frameworks free citizens relied on to attain autonomy and social identity. The rights
bestowed by government could not be granted if the nation was forever fractured by war. For
this reason, one Curtin aide referred to “sectionalism and disunionism” as “the twin relics of
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prostituted power.” 8 Without democratic principle and the rights of the people, the nation faced
anarchy.
Curtin appeared willing to appease southerners during the secession crisis to thwart civil
war. However, when tens of thousands began to fall on battlefields, he like many of his
contemporaries came to the realization that to strike at slavery was to dismantle the foundations
of the South’s war machine. Ending chattel bondage decreased the likelihood of future civil
wars and sectional animosity. As Chapter Two explains, Curtin regarded emancipation as a
moral measure in safeguarding the rights and well-being of Federal troops and their families. He
modified his sense of liberalism from the protection of economic opportunity and advocated a
powerful federal military and political authority for the benefit of steadfast countrymen. Prior
notions of personal liberty and equality were further highlighted as key virtues of Curtin’s Union
cause—and he proposed wartime policies to reflect this ambitious agenda.
Active liberal policies supplemented Curtin’s existing democratic political styles of
moderation and compromise. He maintained this axiom even as the war pressed him toward
more aggressive strategies. This vein of his politicking was best demonstrated at the Loyal War
Governors’ Conference in September 1862. Established in the wake of Union defeat at Second
Bull Run, Curtin spearheaded the conference as an initiative to promote war aims and politically
buttress the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. The collective rhetoric of the thirteen
governors signaled resounding support for the President’s policies. Lending additional backing
to the Proclamation, the state executives heralded the decision to strike at the heart of the
rebellion in the name of all generations and civilizations, present and future. Addressing the
rebellion, human costs, and rights of individuals, the document is an ideological predecessor to
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the Gettysburg Address. The declaration further illustrates how Curtin was part of a political
revolution that no longer could or would tolerate slavery on the national scale. The conference’s
interstate coalition of dual interests helped solidify how liberalism manifested itself in American
politics.
Historian Harry S. Stout contends that the Emancipation Proclamation was released “in
response not to moral imperatives . . . but the exigencies of war.” 9 Through their written
response to emancipation, Curtin and his fellow governors reveal this statement to be a halftruth. Both proclamations were founded in moral convictions, not entirely for slaves in bondage,
but for the combatants waging war on behalf of the national life. From Curtin’s perspective,
emancipation was an act of necessity for the nation’s soldiers and families, consciously
calibrated by military measures implemented to defeat the Confederacy.
Curtin’s liberalism was in part a contract, a mutually reinforcing system in which the
people and their government shared responsibility for each other’s welfare and advancement. In
one public statement supporting Pennsylvania soldiers and allowing the remittance of their pay
to kin, Curtin and his commissioners noted that “[d]eprivation from home” combined with the
daily toils of soldiering was a “curse.” Yet, hardship endured for “the ability of man for selfgovernment” was to be praised. “In the same spirit, too,” Curtin reflected, “the Government and
the laws seek to protect and preserve you—for in your safety and success we are all saved.” 10
The ability of the laborer (and later the soldier) to attain the rights of contract and protection in
domestic and military life was in itself was a form of emancipation that spoke to the rights of
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free citizens as much as it did slaves. 11 The Emancipation Proclamation and the governors’
declaration were ethical documents, for they helped voice the salvation through force northerners
earnestly desired.
The governor’s moral measures went beyond those dealing with emancipation, as is
discussed in Chapter Three. Following the Battle of Gettysburg, a fight which claimed over
50,000 casualties, Curtin was aghast at the conditions on the battlefield. In response, Curtin
himself visited the ravaged town and immediately helped coordinate relief efforts. He oversaw
the shipment of much-needed supplies and appointed Republican attorney David Wills as his
agent for disinterring the dead, identifying their remains, and laying them to rest in a newly
established Soldiers’ National Cemetery—a monument that teaches a compelling lesson for
posterity.
As these actions demonstrated, Curtin’s invoked reverence and reward in the care of
those casualties who survived and proper burials for those who did not. The president and
governor foresaw this time as a pivotal moment for the Union war effort. Both leaders attended
the dedication ceremonies on November 19, 1863 and paid homage to the dead in two distinct
ways. Lincoln’s words in the Gettysburg Address embodied the righteous essence of the
northern cause by interpreting the key themes of equality, sacrifice, and the “unfinished work” of
war and substantiating national ideals. Meanwhile, Curtin’s actions embodied the themes vital to
national healing, commemoration, rebuilding, and merit. By helping to spearhead the efforts in
creating such a burial ground—by noting that the Union dead were deserving of honor—Curtin
helped set the stage for the Gettysburg Address and what it came to represent in American
consciousness. In organizing these efforts of recovery and remembrance, Curtin also ensured
11
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that the dead had not died in vain. Failing to memorialize the fallen on behalf of the living
would not speak well of a democracy dedicated to the collective sacrifices of individuals.
Although viewed as cautious by some in his own party, Curtin was widely known as the
“Soldier’s Friend” by combatants and their families due to his willingness to support them on
and off the battlefield. In doing so, he again built upon his liberal ideology by fusing state
initiatives with broad policies for social betterment. The same month the Soldiers’ National
Cemetery was dedicated, Curtin set out to establish a state-funded school for war orphans
following an encounter with two unfortunate children on the steps of the governor’s mansion on
Thanksgiving 1863. In the coming months, a sum of $50,000 was acquired to create the desired
establishment for the displaced youth of Pennsylvania. The genesis of the school system
initiated a nationwide effort to help mend the many domestic woes resulting from war.
Curtin’s motives behind creating war orphanages were spurred by ideals beyond common
decency or political calculation. Their establishment was a partial repayment of the debt the
state owed the orphans’ fathers. The act was a measure to avert child poverty and subsequent
lives of crime. In the governor’s mind, these children were worthy of education and personal
prospects. Curtin considered the orphanage system the ideal method of nurturing Pennsylvania’s
youth to become well-versed and engaged citizens. The governor’s philosophy was propelled by
the continued belief in mutual defense between a nation and its citizens. The most fitting way of
paying tribute to Pennsylvania’s dead was to offer their children the democratic dreams their
fathers died to protect. The military efforts of the soldier dead and educations of their children
emerged as two distinct forms of advancing the state and nation through forward-looking liberal
thought.

9
In the generations since his passing, the prominence of Andrew Curtin’s role in
Republican politics, the Union war effort, and the care of Federal troops has faded from the rich
historiography of the four year conflict. Although it is not my intention to revive or glorify his
career, I will offer a comprehensive understanding of his convictions within the larger
frameworks of Civil War society and politics—especially in the nation’s quest to seek a moral
understanding of the carnage inflicted in the name of humanity. By examining his life through
his views on secession, emancipation, and Union troops, one can attain new insights into the
transitions and growth of the Union’s Civil War—and why it resonates to this day.
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Chapter 1
“The madness that now rules the hour . . .”
Andrew Curtin, Secession, and the Coming of War
Pennsylvania’s Republicans knew what caliber of leader they desired. Their February 1860
convention in Harrisburg chose a candidate with a familiar record and an impressive list of
professional achievements. Forty-three year old lawyer Andrew Gregg Curtin was a Free Soil
advocate, ex-Whig, and staunch nationalist. His supporters made the case for his electability
clear from the outset: he “proved devotion to the protection of American Industry, involving the
dearest and most material welfare of the people of this Commonwealth, and his earnest fidelity to
the interests of the white man, and opposition to the extension of slavery over our Territories.”
As “a representative of the principle of reform” Curtin was the ideal candidate to lead the
“central” commonwealth and helping uphold “the maintenance of the Union.” 1 In their most
basic forms, these phrases capture the essence of Curtin’s gubernatorial career amidst the
nation’s darkest days. He remained constant to these tenets, yet also elaborated them in the name
of Union.
Eleven months later, his hopes of sectional reconciliation were fleeting. The tumultuous
January of 1861 was a month filled with uncertainty, fear, and political zealotry. In the previous
weeks, the fire-eaters of South Carolina seceded as a result of Abraham Lincoln’s election. The
previous fall also marked the political ascension of Republican candidates elected to posts as
senators, congressmen, and governors of northern states. Curtin was one such Republican who
rode this wave, winning his state with a 32,000 vote majority. The Keystone State leader was
sworn into office on January 15, 1861 before a crowd of thousands in Harrisburg. Despite the

1
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festive atmosphere, the times were fraught with tension. Curtin’s inauguration fell in the middle
of a two-week period that witnessed the secession of five additional southern states.
For Curtin, divisive rhetoric regarding disunion and secession threatened key civic virtues
that many ex-Whigs thought imperative for the country’s success: notions of majority rule, the
ideals of self-advancement (in both business and politics), and the sanctity of the Union.
Curtin’s perspectives on the roots and remedies of the coming Civil War evolved over time. In
1861, he perceived the conflict as a struggle to determine the fate of the common man’s potential
and the American system that provided for advancement. The approaching war of ideals
determined whether such prospects of political and economic freedom could endure. With this
mindset, Curtin embraced liberal principles—the belief that freedom and the path to prosperity
was built upon individual autonomy and agency. 2 Sensing the social currents that elected him,
Curtin recognized that citizens “were demanding justice for themselves.” 3 Justice was
eventually delivered, but at a price higher than most thought possible.
The governor’s inaugural address was characteristic of his Whig traits as political
division hastened the nation closer to fratricidal warfare. His Unionist ideology conveyed the
thought that politicians should be bound by interconnectivity with the nation rather than divided
by a separation of state borders. As the Arkansas Whig wrote years earlier, Whigs (and later
Republicans) had “an abiding faith in the power and strength of law, and of the moral and
intelligent functions of the government.” They believed that the politician “qualifiedly
impersonates a moral power, representing not the aggregate, but the unity, the one-mindedness,
in a moral sense of the whole American people.” In this sense, “[d]eliberation and compromise

2
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were thus essential,” and Curtin ascribed to this ideal with great vigor. 4 The Union was a
national family, prone to bickering, but kin nevertheless. The ideology foreshadowed his
willingness to compromise as an alternative to war—but not at the expense of surrendering
Pennsylvania’s productivity. His precise and carefully-crafted inaugural oration treads with
moderation and caution in light of the political situation. However, the address also alludes to
the ideological schism between North and South that originated in the wake of the Mexican War.
By the 1850s, new commercial patterns and increasing sectional acrimony exhausted unities and
ties of decades past—setting the stage for disunion. 5 As tension escalated, Curtin feared the
common man’s rights to self-determination would be threatened if the menaces of slavery and
secession broke the sacred covenant of Union.
Alarmingly, dissolution had the potential to damage the byproducts of enfranchisement
by destroying businesses, property, and credit on a nationwide scale. A majority of
Pennsylvanians thought Curtin would help remedy the situation. The previous October, Curtin
was greeted with “enthusiastic cheers” at an “immense” torch rally in Germantown. A reporter
conveyed the audience’s mentality: “It was of little importance what man they elected but by the
election the political sentiment of the people was demonstrated. The safety of the Government,
the integrity of the Union, depended upon the issues. The cry of disunion was of no avail; the
people of Pennsylvania demanded protection and freedom.” 6 But as Curtin announced two
months earlier, freedom and government went hand-in-hand: “To produce perfect harmony
between the interests of the State and the country, and that kindness of feeling which should exist
between the people of the State and their metropolis,” Curtin exclaimed, “you need but one
4
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thing, and that is protection to your labor.” The only sure way of protecting labor was by
developing power, increasing wealth, and expanding the state’s resources. He warned: “Let no
miscreant cry of disunion turn freemen from the path to their first duty to their State and
themselves. Ever loyal to the Union, let the People’s Party of Pennsylvania strong in their might
resolve most determinedly to have protection to their labor.” 7
Although most southerners believed liberalism guaranteed property and citizenship rights
only for the upper crust of white male society, Curtin’s perspective was more proactive. In the
antebellum era, “liberal Republicans valued an economy which did not sustain a monopoly of the
wealthy but which rewarded the common person.” Furthermore, the free labor mantle heralded
by Republicans defended the right of opportunity for all citizens, especially the middle class. 8
The protection of free labor and wages for larger portions of white society, coupled with an
active government that nurtured such growth was a genuine articulation of freedom. 9 But could
that freedom persevere under trying circumstances? Curtin’s judicious speech attempted to
answer that all important question. The governor asked for the guidance of President-elect
Lincoln regarding this topic one month before his inauguration, hoping to “harmonize” their
collective inaugural messages. 10 Lincoln replied: “I think of nothing proper for me to suggest
except a word about this secession and disunion movement—On that subject, I think you would
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do well to express, without passion, threat, or appearance of boasting, but nevertheless, with
firmness, the purpose of yourself, and your state to maintain the Union at all hazards.” 11
Curtin’s inauguration took place on a brisk January 15, 1861. Following a thirty-three
(the number of “united” states) gun salute and benediction, the governor-elect arose from the
wood planked platform on the capitol steps, kissed the bible following his oath, and commenced
with his inaugural in the crisp, frigid air. 12 Throughout Curtin’s oration, he articulated visions of
the country’s past as well as those of its future in the effort to determine the nation’s identity and
aspirations. Eighty-five years had passed since the country’s founding and national ideals
remained strongly linked to those of its creation. In response, the new governor urged his
country to live up to “the expectations of its founders” by preserving their most significant
legacy: the country itself. Curtin perceived this inheritance to be a “liberal capacity for selfgovernment, and . . . the importance of preserving [the Union], pure and unsullied as it came
from the hands of the Apostles of Liberty.” 13 The rights of nationhood and the promises of
autonomy were goals of the Revolution and thus heirlooms of the Founders themselves.
Such capacity measured freedom’s scope and determined the guarantees of citizenship.
Liberal ideology was, as historian François Furstenberg has argued, rooted “in property, focused
on individual rights, legitimized by consent [majority rule], and buttressed by contractual
theory.” 14 Slavery and so-called “wage slavery” instigated class conflict, economic disparity,
and challenged the contract theory vital to the harmony of interests. 15 Economic (as well as
political) kinship conformed “free choice” with “social order” while also depending upon
11
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compliance rather than constraint. 16 The powers of balance and choice were key to free
individuals. But arguments over secession and slavery questioned whether the idea of national
contract could long abide.
As Curtin’s rhetoric suggests, the unity of the states was vital for the success of
individuals and their country. Efforts of protection through these notions of partnership and
dual-interest underscored fundamental principles of the governor’s liberalism. As Civil War era
liberal E. L. Godkin noted, “A contract, both in law and in political economy, is an agreement
entered into by two perfectly free agents, with full knowledge of its nature, and under no
compulsion either to refuse or accept it.” Contract denoted the assets of freedom and the limits
of coercion. Under ideal circumstances, the rights supplied by this principle offered individual
liberty, prompted exchange, and bolstered mutual consent. 17 The sectional and ideological
divergence concerning governmental power, secession, and slavery fueled arguments over
whether such principles could endure amidst disunion. 18
Amid this fight Democrats were unwilling to abide by their supposed “cardinal doctrine”
of majority rule, Republicans argued. 19 The Presbyterian Banner and Advocate of Pittsburgh
demanded, “Let the law be executed with promptitude and impartiality, and, under the
Constitution and in accordance with law, let the majority rule. Such is Republicanism, and such
is Democracy; such is the right reason and such is holy Scripture.” 20 The national compact
intended to bind the nation’s states together as a cohesive Union was nothing less than a holy
alliance in Curtin’s opinion. To allow southern states to shatter this alliance on a whim was “to
16
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confess that our government is a failure,” Curtin contended. No state could voluntarily retract
itself from the bond of Union as was ordained by the Constitution. Referring to the United States
as the greatest of all political institutions in human history, Curtin warned southerners not “to
alter any of the fundamental principles of the great charter of our liberties.” Both sides of the
ensuing war claimed the mantle of the Founders, insisting their respective cause absorbed
founding ideals, while simultaneously casting their enemies as traitors to the historical legacy of
the past. 21
Curtin’s historical references to framers, apostles, and charters reveal the considerable
relevance of the republic’s creators. Even though he longed for a peaceful solution to the
secession crisis, the governor was disgusted by the “attempt to wrest from the federal
government the powers which the people conferred on it when they adopted the constitution.”
Scores of his political brethren agreed. Undermining the federal system the Founders conceived
was a gross injustice as well as a poor display of civic integrity in the minds of most northerners.
Curtin aide Alexander K. McClure boasted to the electorate: Lincoln and Curtin “will stand man
to man with us in securing and enjoying the crowning national triumph of the age, that will
restore us to the policy of our fathers—our Government to dignity, and our people to
prosperity.” 22 Success came with cooperation, and this accord (especially between states) was a
key facet of Unionism.
The legacy of the Founders surpassed sheer notions of sentimentality or ideological
convictions. Their efforts served as the foundation for the stability and growth of the future.
This sense of national pride and potential afforded by the creators were central in the formation

21

Bernstein, 128-9.
“Col. McClure at the Wigwam Again,” Pennsylvania Daily Telegraph, October 20, 1860, accessed February 27,
2012, p. 2. Pennsylvania Civil War Newspapers. Penn State University.

22

17
of citizens’ national honor, character, and discourse. 23 The framers of the Constitution, William
H. Seward noted, “regarded the Union as no mere national or American interest”—it was
representative of a grand ideal to humanity on a worldwide scale. Thus, both the Founders and
the citizens of 1861 feared “that their failure to continue and perfect the Union would be a
misfortune to the nations,” and perhaps all mankind, Seward concluded. 24
Curtin did not hesitate to invoke the names of the revolutionaries who inspired him to
pursue public office. The America that Republicans envisioned was endowed by the power and
supremacy of the Constitution, a document that promoted “persuasion, not coercion.” 25 Curtin
fully agreed with the new president’s views of the Founders’ ideas, noting that thanks to the
“Apostles of Liberty . . . [our land is] fraternal in its aims, liberal in its spirit, and patriotic in its
progress.” Lincoln’s own liberal nature demonstrated a desire to construct democracy by
showing empathy toward individuals and striking at oppression. 26 The aristocratic system of the
South morally weakened the nation as a whole. Therefore, Curtin promoted liberalism because
he felt it patriotically and economically superior to the South’s chattel system and political
bullying. For the governor, the wealth seen throughout Pennsylvania was thanks to the “profuse
liberality” that sustained his state. Many rallied to his cry. Commonwealth Judge William
Dock, for example, abandoned the Democratic Party because he could no longer belong to an
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organization supportive of “an institution inconsistent with the principles upon which our
government is based, and destructive of the interests of free white labor.” 27
Facing the reality of secession, the Jeffersonian ideal that citizens could adapt or annul
their government when it became too overreaching was one that Curtin and Lincoln refused to
recognize. 28 The latter argued the Union was perpetual and secession was a subversion of
democratic principles. The Constitution did not advocate its own termination. 29 For
Republicans, southern advocacy for secession proved their inability to abide by the results of a
completely free and democratic election. 30 While Curtin’s ideological opponents in the South
embraced the notion that the Confederate cause was the living legacy of the Revolution, he felt
strongly otherwise. Although Confederates used “revolution” as a symbolic term to connect to
the Spirit of ‘76, they saw their world “dedicated to the proposition that men were not created
equal, a beacon of true liberty and a tribune of racial truth against the corruptions of modern
democracy and equality.” 31 Their idea of nationhood was a direct contradiction to those of
Lincoln and his allies.
Whereas Curtin and fellow Republicans believed citizens had no right to secede, they did
have the right to voice displeasure and debate democratically. “The freedom of speech and of
the press, the right of conscience and of private judgment in civil and religious faith, are the high
prerogatives to which the American citizen is born,” Curtin argued in his address. The right to
express one’s opinion in public was a liberty handed from the forefathers but also allowed for
debates regarding secession to permeate throughout the nation. Northerners, especially
27
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abolitionists, easily thrust blame upon the South for “mob violence,” the censoring of free speech
via gag rules, and limits on the right of petition. Many had little doubt that the slave states were
out to subvert the liberties northern citizens cherished. 32 At the same time, staunch abolitionists
such as William Lloyd Garrison openly welcomed secession, claiming disunion was a better
option than having to co-exist with the purge of slavery. Curtin intently disagreed.
Despite his dislike of abolitionist rhetoric, the principle of “free speech” was vital in the
creation of Curtin’s Republican Party. The phrase embodied an upward-thinking society in
which law, dialogue, and individual liberty were respected and promoted. The social and
economic nature of the South in which slavery thrived was antithetical to this understanding.
Republicans such as Curtin believed free speech concerned the freedom of the press,
encouraging healthy debate, and maintaining domestic ties. Most southern leaders no longer
wished to play this game. 33 All the while, northerners were angered by the South repetitively
winning the contentious debates shaping national policy—especially those regarding slavery and
the settlement of the American West. This pattern proved tiring for Yankee politicians.
As one Pennsylvania editorialist complained, “if the Union does not preserve our
liberties, if it does not protect us in the enjoyment of free speech, free labor, free soil and
freedom of the press . . . if the Union is intended only to protect the slave-holding aristocrat in
the enjoyment of his rights . . . who cares how soon” the Union is dissolved? 34 Citizens
expressing such anxieties found a friend in the new Republican Party. But while rights to free
speech were true in their legal and philosophical sense, the factors of race and politics
determined whether one could practice the luxuries of citizenship. Shortly after Curtin’s election
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and shortly before Lincoln’s, “A Jefferson Democrat” wrote to Pennsylvania’s Central Press:
“We claim to live in a land of liberty, a land where the right of conscientiously worshiping God,
where freedom of speech and of the press are constitutionally guaranteed to all; and is this truly
the case? No! The degradation of the slave of the South is as deep and great as that to which
their masters would subjugate the freemen of the North,” he argued. “I voted for the Hon. A. G.
Curtin, because he was a fair exponent of the doctrines and principles which I adhere to, and . . .
because I knew him to be opposed to the extension of slavery.” 35
Northerners’ freedom of speech was under siege by the forces of pro-slavery activists
who countermanded the Free Soil ideology of Republicans. This political creed of the rising
party was mocked by a Democratic paper reporting a Curtin speech: “The Black Republican
Invincibles will doubtless do their whole duty in shouting for ‘freedom of speech,’. . . ‘free
niggers’ and ‘free love.’” 36 Heated rhetoric as such was implemented by Democrats to incite
racial fears against Republican adversaries in attempts to connect them with radical abolitionists
and delegitimize their political platform.
Vitriolic outbursts were rooted in a long line of events that altered the political and social
discourse of antebellum America. Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, a growing
number of constituents became concerned with labor and how it might be affected by slavery and
government. Curtin and Lincoln shared these apprehensions. The former’s anxiety in wanting to
implement liberal state policy that provided “ample protection to capital and labor, and to the
community at large” became evident in his inaugural. But to fully comprehend the ideological
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thoughts and evolution in the minds of such individuals, one must reexamine the Whig and Free
Soil political culture from which they rose to power.

“Momentous Consequences”
In a lifespan of two decades, the Whig Party had advocated industrialization, protectionism,
better education, and largely opposed the Jacksonian policies to decentralize government’s
authority in the private sphere. Curtin argued that the “vast resources of Pennsylvania and the
variety of her mechanical and other industrial pursuits invite capital and enterprise from abroad,
which, on every sound principle of political economy, should be encouraged.” The government,
whether local or national, should play an active part in this endeavor, he believed.

All the

layers of the governmental structure should converge to assist commoners “economically,
socially, and morally” via civic and business institutions and initiatives. In promoting this
agenda, Whigs (and later Republicans) hoped economic diversity and freedom could heighten
one’s personal headway in the public sphere. 37 The platform helped citizens help themselves.
Would this not allow people to more successfully follow “the pursuit of happiness” and nurture
“public good?” 38 Curtin believed so.
The Pennsylvania Daily Telegram urged its readers to contemplate this fact on the eve of
Lincoln’s election by noting that the state’s “resources depend for success on protection. Her
labor cannot rise to that strength and power necessary to compete with a foreign trade, unless
fostered and protected by special legislative enactment, which would not only shield and
encourage the industry of this Commonwealth, but also extend its influence to the labor of other
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States” and therefore aid “all nations and communities.” 39 Given the rhetoric in his opening
address, Curtin was aware that the national compact of Union was bound by name and collective
identity as well as monetary ties. State and national governments were thought as foundations of
economic protection and stability to protect manufacturers and their employees from the lethal
elements of the market economy. This feature of American liberty, Curtin stated in a hometown
speech, “seems to have been established by divine mission. Here [liberty] is exhibited in its
growth, by the power of its influence, when the minds of those who are to receive it, have been
properly prepared in advance.” 40
Pennsylvania’s “power of influence” ushered in an era of economic sustainability and
commercial enterprise, especially in heavy industry and transportation. Under such
circumstances, many businesses within the state embraced federally-supported protection. Like
fellow Whigs-turned-Republicans, Curtin argued for this model of business during his terms.
“The association of capital and labor,” he contended, “under acts of incorporation, where the
purposes to be accomplished are beyond the reach of individual enterprise, has long been the
policy of the State, and has done much to advance the prosperity of the people.” 41
In order to help Pennsylvanians attain this entrepreneurial success, “aid to the Farmers’
High School” (now the Pennsylvania State University) and support for “scientific culture” was
necessary. To “reward labor” and fostering ingenuity were high priorities of officials seeking to
grow prospects in multiple tiers of society. “Education is as essential to liberty as religion is to
virtue,” Curtin said in an 1859 lecture. With “educational refinement, the man becomes free, and
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nations and races are formed for glory and usefulness.” 42 The governor later extolled this belief
as war’s costs threatened to inhibit America’s youngest generations. For Curtin, beneficent
institutions and businesses were not independent bodies, but complimentary establishments that
collectively supported the progress of the state and each other. This conception helped initiate a
transformation in which many corporations and businessmen were seen as ambitious pioneers of
enterprise rather than faceless shysters of monopoly. 43
Despite its brief tenure, the Whig Party that influenced Curtin helped create these
perceptions of business, government, and the public’s interaction with the two. Whigs
implemented hierarchical, technological, and creative approaches to help recast the society in
which they lived and worked. 44 Curtin’s own Whig desires to instigate economic progress and
industrialization recurred within his inaugural speech and career as a whole. “Our temperate
climate, productive soil, and inexhaustible mineral wealth,” he noted, “have stimulated the
industry of our people and improved the skill of our mechanics. To develop, enlarge, and protect
the interests which grow out of pure natural advantages, have become cardinal principles of
political economy in Pennsylvania.” 45
For Republicans, Curtin was an ideal standard bearer to promote and uphold governing
practices. Biographer William Henry Egle contended that the governor was “a believer in
systematic and efficient protection [of labor], in liberal internal improvements, and in the policy
of encouraging well-paid and wide-diffused free American labor.” 46 Curtin considered the
integration of economics and politics not only healthy, but necessary in fostering the dual
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interests of the public and business. Cooperation offered success at all levels of society so long
as the Union providing it could maintain itself—and therein was the dilemma in 1861.
The fortunes of free labor rested in more than cultivating successful business. Threats of
slavery compromised the rewards of the free worker. Republicans formed their political
opinions with the conviction of increasing the rights “to human self-development” that granted
individual freedom. 47 Whiggery was emblematic of an era in which citizens desired to transform
their humble origins into lives of accomplishment and worth. 48 Slavery was a direct obstruction
and contradiction to this philosophy. 49 From Curtin’s perspective, slavery and sectional
differences were detrimental to national credit, currency, and the protection of capital. This
“deranging” of business and society had the potential to ruin the foundations on which
Pennsylvania’s economic success was built. Monetary and national interests were at the heart of
Curtin’s anti-slavery endeavors. Prosperity was vulnerable to the dangers of slavery as it
expanded across the land. Not only were bondage and its ramifications adverse to the core
doctrines of democracy, but they imperiled the economic roots that democracy was meant to
nurture. By reducing the potential of the free worker, slavery was limiting the potential of
America itself.
According to one newspaper, “This draining of capital has had its influence on every
branch of trade, to the injury of agriculture and credit, and the utter prostration of the finances of
individuals and communities.” For these reasons and more, “protecting home industry” became
a vital aspect of the Republican platform in Pennsylvania. 50 “Can we expect protection from the
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Democratic Party?” Curtin asked of a Philadelphia crowd in 1860. “[They] dare not declare for
protection on the laboring man, whose labor is the basis of our wealth and prosperity.” 51 The
American economy was a system of shared interest between government, business, and
individual. If one failed, all three could fail. Slavery increased the likelihood of this failure.
By the 1850s, the precarious threats slavery posed to white labor became speedily
apparent to Whig and Republican politicians. The debate over the peculiar institution brought
the former party to ruin. Not only did early Republicans believe slavery undermined the ability
of the worker to earn a decent living on an economic and moral level, but they also felt that the
“Slave Power” was a conspiracy headed by calculating southern politicians to subvert the
Constitution and government for their own financial empowerment. The striver’s ethic, not
slavery, was the key to economic growth and social mobility. For citizens concerned with such
issues in the North, the southern establishment struck at the heart of their dreams to institute a
society predicated on free labor. 52 This debate was of great import in 1861, as Curtin explained:
“To develop, enlarge, and protect the interests which grow out of pure natural advantages, have
become cardinal principles of political economy in Pennsylvania.” Popular thought among the
people demonstrates that “progress, and the law depend on educated and requited labor; and that
labor and the interests sustained by it should be adequately protected against foreign
competition.” If citizens had the power to advance themselves, Curtin recognized their noble
efforts as worthy of guardianship—protection from external forces—as reward.
Curtin never once used the term “slavery” in his inaugural speech. The governor used
phrases such as “local” and “peculiar” institutions when speaking of human bondage. Although
decidedly opposed to chattel slavery due to its adverse affects on free labor, Curtin did not
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directly attack it for fear he would incite additional secession and possible violence. “From the
abundance of the resources of the State and nation,” predicted the Philadelphia Press, “[Curtin]
believes that the pecuniary difficulties will soon be righted, unless complicated by a civil war. . .
. [T]he tone will be highly conciliatory, and the address will be well received.” 53 But his views
against slavery’s expansion were well known to Democrats, who said he spoke on behalf of
“niggerism,” eventual amalgamation, and national ruin. 54 Republicans retaliated by writing,
“Col. Curtin comes in for a large share of defamation, simply because he occupies a prominent
position for the people.” 55 Such was how Curtin viewed the purpose of government: for the
people.
At that time, slaves were not viewed as people and portions of the governor’s address
reveal a complaisant attitude toward chattel bondage. He noted, “[Pennsylvanians] have
faithfully adhered to the compromises of our great national compact, and willingly recognized
the peculiar institutions and rights of property of the people of other States. Every true
Pennsylvanian admits that his first civil and political duty is to the general government.” The
moderate nature of Curtin’s political ideology (compared to ardent abolitionists) was the reason
Republicans nominated him for governor. Curtin’s election nevertheless pleased some
Pennsylvania abolitionists. As one constituent in the Tioga Valley wrote, Curtin’s triumph “was
hailed by the earnest people of our quiet valley as the sign of redemption, and the herald of
universal emancipation, from the bound of eternal slavery.” Curtin and his followers “showed
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that the great idea which the people of Pennsylvania have generalized by endorsing the principles
of Republicanism, is, that FREE territory shall forever REMAIN free.” 56
Curtin then cared little for what most abolitionists thought. His foremost concern was
Union and its promise. Through his willingness to honor the rights of slaveholders, he revealed
his openness to compromise as an alternative to disunion. Many moderate politicians of the
North felt moral anxiety over slavery, but felt incapable of taking action without inciting further
sectional strife. Following his inauguration, Curtin said, “by a prompt repeal of ever statute that
may, even by implication, be liable to reasonable objection, do our part to remove every just
cause for dissatisfaction within our legislation.” He considered constitutional remedies to the
situation to be “example[s] of magnanimity and implicit obedience to the paramount law.” 57
More radical Republicans were unwilling to compromise for they felt negotiation
destroyed the sanctity of both the Union and the Constitution rather than mended it. To
capitulate to the demands of southern politicos inhibited republican government. 58 Yet Curtin
revealed his openness to compromise, a trait he admired of his Whig hero, Henry Clay. Without
the ability to share dialogue, many politicians felt they lost the ability to govern. Compromise
was a key feature of democracy, and most southerners had lost their ability to participate in this
system. Northerners, even loyal Democrats, realized cooler heads had to attempt to prevail for
the sake of a united (though still ideologically split) nation. “We have had such difficulties and
estrangement before,” claimed Gettysburg’s Democratic Compiler, “and we always had to get
together again by mutual concession and compromise, after years of senseless warfare upon each
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other. . . . We call upon all . . . to speak out in favor of union and harmony.” 59 If only southern
Democrats had felt the same way.
While Curtin addressed the “fearful uncertainty” and “weakening of commercial credit,”
southerners had even more at stake if the fieriest of Republicans were to have their way. For as
vitriolic as slavery matters were, political and economic capital were at stake if southerners lost
influence in Washington. Slavery endured because the South long reigned supreme in all three
branches of the U. S. Government. 60 But Curtin did not subscribe to the dough face trend of
granting the South all its wishes. On these sentiments, pro-Curtin editorialists were frustrated:
“we are fairly sick to death—nauseated—with the howl of secession and dissolution which goes
up from reckless, unprincipled Southern throats, and is taken up and lovingly re-echoed by the
northern curs of low degree who only bark as their cotton-growing masters give the pitch.” 61
Curtin was willing to negotiate through strength, hoping that compromise would succeed
as it had in previous decades. Referring to southerners as “friends and fellow countrymen,” the
governor appealed to his citizens in the same manner Lincoln would two months later by asking
Americans to summon “the better angels of our nature.” Although Curtin touted the “supremacy
of national government” and free labor, he was more than willing to make concessions to the
slaveholding South. In fact, he stated, “I have already taken occasion to state publicly, and I now
repeat, that if we have any laws upon our statute books which infringe upon the rights of the
people of any of the States, or contravene any law of the federal government, or obstruct its
execution, they ought to be repealed.” 62
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His statements did not imply that some Republicans were beyond making feeble
concessions to prevent further dissolution of the Union. Charles Francis Adams, for one, put
forth conciliatory approaches regarding the western territories and fugitive slaves which
empowered slaveholders still in the Union. Neither Republicans nor the nation as a whole,
however, could risk further disenfranchisement by “emboldening disunionists” and caving in to
their additional threats. Lincoln and Curtin were well aware of this fact. “The people mean to
preserve the integrity of the national union at every hazard,” Curtin noted. Lincoln again tried
to walk the middle ground and attempted to reconcile without confining federal authority. 63 The
effort made little headway.
Meanwhile, many northerners rejected compromise and concession. These constituents
voted Republicans into office to protect themselves, not southerners. Curtin himself noted,
“Conscious of their rights and their power, the people looked to the ballot-box alone as the legal
remedy for existing evils.” He argued that citizens had the right to “vindicate” their will in “fair
elections . . . at the ballot-box.” The statement was too little, too late in the eyes of most south of
the Mason-Dixon Line. As Carl Becker has stated, majority rule is most efficient only when
electoral defeat does not bring about “a fatal surrender of vital interests.” 64 And such is exactly
how many southerners viewed the election of Abraham Lincoln. Slavery was too cardinal to
every sphere of southern life to depend on the outcomes of Election Day. From Lincoln’s
perspective, allowing the minority to dictate governance made the purpose of that government
superfluous and only gave the minority additional leverage to continue unlawful patterns.
“Plainly,” he wrote, “the central idea of secession, is the essence of anarchy.” 65
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The Pennsylvania governor may have had other issues in mind when he called for
reason and compromise. The undeniable fact that Pennsylvania’s economy was connected
through trade with the South generated great concern as sectional crisis arose. These worries
were prominently elaborated in Curtin’s address. Pennsylvania was the borderland of North and
South, East and West. “[W]ith the great avenues of trade and travel passing through her borders,
carrying on an extensive commerce with her neighbors, in the vast and varied productions of her
soil, her mines, and her manufacturing industry, and bound to them by the ties of kindred and
social intercourse,” Curtin said, “the question of disunion involves momentous consequences to
her people.” Disunion epitomized potential ruin in every way imaginable.
Because of Pennsylvania’s ingrained economic ties to the South, Curtin contended that
“the question of disunion involves momentous consequences to her people.” But this divisive
quarreling was as old as the Republic itself. The ability to compromise became increasingly
difficult within the “cult of honor” that was prevalent in the antebellum era. A willingness to
make concessions was frequently coded as being weak and unmanly by pundits and politicians.
Up until 1860, use of the word “disunion” was implemented as an instrument to threaten and
gain political sway, not to actually split the nation. 66 Perpetual fear of disunion was rampant,
wrote one writer with the Atlantic Monthly only two months before Curtin’s election, because
“danger of a dissolution of the Union” had so frequently been used as a “scarecrow” tactic. 67
Still, the governor gave hope that “the madness that now rules the hour will subside, as
[the government’s] patriotic, faithful, and national aims bring ample protection and peaceful
progress to all sections of the Republic.” At the same time, repetitive use of disunion rhetoric
“limited American’s political and moral imagination, ultimately discouraging the politics of
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compromise and lending an aura of inexorability to the cataclysmic confrontation of North and
South.” 68 The liberal-mindedness Curtin thought integral to the right of man’s self-advancement
was endangered because the government that promoted it could be fractured by war. Disunion
(and slavery) posed ominous threats to the political and economic frameworks free citizens relied
on to attain autonomy.
As the governor had hoped, the address was well received by the general public—at least
in Pennsylvania. Harrisburg’s North American observed “a spirit of fraternal kindness” in the
governor’s “frank and manly” articulation. The Bulletin asserted, “The address is remarkably
moderate and conciliatory. It condems [sic] the secession movement, but hopes it may be
arrested without resorting to extreme measures.” 69 Even Democratic opponents found
themselves nodding in approval over many of Curtin’s sentiments. The Patriot & Union
confessed the speech was far more magnanimous “than we had reason to acticipate [sic], that it
has occasioned an agreeable surprise. Not that we can commend many of its utterances, but,
considering the ultra position taken by many of Governor Curtin’s political friends . . . the
sentiments embodied in the Inaugural are as conservative as a Republican dare at this particular
juncture. 70 The governor’s judicious nature persisted throughout his tenure, but his liberal spirit
toward the rights of his constituents altered as scores of Pennsylvania boys began perishing on
battlefields of the ensuing war.
Curtin delivered his inaugural address at a crossroads moment for the country. Northern
leaders could have taken a complacent, indecisive stance toward secession as the James
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Buchanan administration had done; or they could actively pursue a preservative course for the
Union and all it stood for. At that critical moment, Curtin chose the latter. Maintaining the
Union as the legacy of the Founding Fathers represented not only honoring their constitutional
ideals but that the common man should be afforded the equal opportunity to advance himself
with the striver’s ethic and the liberal spirit of his society. Slavery, secession, and disunion
marked startling contrasts and threats to these moral rights and potentials of American society.
Curtin, Lincoln, and scores of fellow Republicans realized these glaring facts at the outset of
sectional divergence. Within weeks of their respective inaugurations, tens of thousands of
northerners answered their call to “promote the union” and defend “the noblest political structure
ever devised and enacted by human wisdom.” Few could have dreamed of what awaited them.
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Chapter 2
“Vigorous Measures”
Andrew Curtin and Emancipation
September 25, 1862 was a day of excitement, grief, and gossip in the soot-covered streets of rail
town Altoona, Pennsylvania. The day’s issue of the Altoona Tribune offered coveted details on
the recent Confederate repulse from Maryland. But with that good news also came the casualty
listings of the 125th Pennsylvania, a local infantry regiment that sustained considerable losses at
the Battle of Antietam. Alongside the sorrowful news were two proclamations President Lincoln
had issued the day before. One statement suspended the writ of habeas corpus, noting that
northern citizens “shall be subject to martial law” should they fail to obey wartime regulations
and maintain loyalty. The second proclamation was a much lengthier one, a pronouncement that
struck at the core of the southern rebellion by manumitting all slaves in bondage in Confederateheld territories, making them “forever free,” if the states in rebellion did not return to the Union
before January 1, 1863.
As these military and political developments unfolded, a confidential convention of
notable political figures had just concluded a meeting in Altoona’s Logan House Hotel. “Their
sessions were secret,” the city’s paper noted, “and although a number of reporters have given
sketches of their proceedings we incline to the opinion that there was considerable guess work
about the reports.” 1 Indeed, the meeting was secretive. But little did the townspeople know that
the conference, convened by their governor Andrew Curtin, carried political weight in the vital
matters they were reading of—especially the recently publicized preliminary Emancipation
Proclamation.
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The Loyal War Governors’ Conference, as the press named the meeting, was a
transitional event in the long process by which northerners gradually adopted emancipation as a
strategic and moral component of the Republican administration’s efforts to win the Civil War.
There was little evidence in the political career of the meeting’s leader, Governor Curtin, to
identify him as a fiery abolitionist or radical. Like most former Whigs and later Republicans,
Curtin’s foremost concerns rested in creating the circumstances for economic sustainability and
prosperity so ordinary white men could thrive. The liberal outlook on society and governance
that defined the policies of Curtin supported systematic change for the benefit of commoners and
the nation as a whole. Although he was not willing to wage a war for the abolition of slavery
from the outset of his career, Curtin developed antipathy toward the peculiar institution after the
Civil War commenced because it stood in the way of the progress he believed offered economic
opportunities and basic rights.
The potential for social and economic mobility intertwined with what scholars have
called the “new world of free trade . . . underpinned by explicit ideologies of liberalism and free
labor, in which the ownership of persons was unacceptable, although in practice the elaboration
of new forms of unfree labor was an important part of the transition.” 2 Furthermore, the
attainment of wealth and property was virtuous because it was tied to national growth. Seeking
wealth and independence in the expanding republic was not selfish, but exemplary and patriotic.
In this regard, liberalism “was the main engine of American expansion.” 3 But if slavery
expanded, that engine could fail. “Slavery,” noted British statesman Richard Cobden in 1864,
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“is the question on which liberalism & humanity throughout the world are mainly interested in
this terrible struggle.” 4
At the same time, northern leaders were forced to concede some liberties in order to
allow others to flourish. Classical liberals, typically against militarization, the seizure of
property, and the suspension of civil liberties, found themselves supporting one of the mightiest
armies and most expansive of governments on earth. The evolving form of liberalism Curtin
embraced came to embody the sanctity and righteousness of the Union Cause—taking much
bolder action than many politicians were willing to gamble in regard to emancipation and the
war. By endorsing martial law and property confiscation in the South, Curtin seemingly
contradicted his own precepts of liberalism protecting the commoner’s autonomous lifestyle and
property.
But how could a constitution that protected individual freedom reign while it
simultaneously protected the right of citizens to possess human property? How could the
republic correct its elemental contradiction without brining itself to destruction? 5 The time to
adopt more strategic measures had arrived. If declaring martial law weakened the efficiency of
slavery and, above all, vindicated the Constitution, such was a risk Curtin was willing to take. In
order to save the liberal spirit of the federal government and society, that same spirit required
flexibility in the name of self-preservation. However, Curtin felt southerners’ rights of safety
were null and void in the wake of secession. He said of his Confederate foes: “Can it be
possible, then, that. . .they are to enjoy this labor, and so be enabled to continue this war, because
it is owned and slave?” he asked. “True it was a right of property regulated by that Constitution
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which they now repudiate with contempt—but it is hard to understand why Northern sympathy
should seek to afford them the protection of the Constitution for the security of any property
which stands in the way of the Government.” Could it be “possible that the destruction of their
interests should be denied to us by those who profess to be loyal to the Government?” 6
National loyalty was the basis for all forms of public reward—a creed that defined the
governor’s career and policies. Confederates were deemed unworthy of such recognition.
Curtin, like Cobden, concluded that the peculiar institution was indeed “against humanity,” but
in slightly different terms. Curtin believed slavery threatened a free society as it already existed
whereas radical abolitionists hoped destroying slavery could recreate America as it should have
been in the first place. Already acknowledging that slavery greatly inhibited visions of national
growth in financial and moral terms, Curtin also realized the institution was one of the most
productive tools in the Confederacy’s war machine. He gradually endorsed broad-minded
stances on emancipation and federal authority, ultimately fusing the notions together with the
ambition of strengthening the Union’s hands.
Notions of liberalism included not only the well-being of the citizenry and the worth of
self but also the authority of the federal government as it broadly helped ensure the protection of
labor, capital, and individual independence. 7 Such convictions demonstrated that “progress was
a pattern of ordered change in which order and change were equally important.” 8 Indeed, federal
emancipation policy was gradual, even as it also was deliberate and transformational. In the case
of many of the governors who met in Altoona, however, they felt action was too gradual, that the
moment to adopt a more decisive stance on emancipation had arrived. From Curtin’s
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perspective, loyal citizens and soldiers were entitled to more rights than traitorous rebels who
benefitted from the toils of human property.
The governors’ deeds illustrated the renewed nature of liberalism in the North. Their
words were less ardent than those of Charles Sumner or Benjamin Wade, but were emblematic of
a larger movement in which Republicans were demanding justice for loyal individuals. This
new, multi-faceted form of politicking blended old notions of agency and reform with the more
contemporary ideals of proactive governance as a measure to ensure prompt Federal victory.
Agency, in the view of François Furstenberg, was the “ability to alter circumstances, to change
the environment, to reform government, and above all to resist oppression.” 9 Curtin sought to
assist in all these objectives by altering the political discourse on emancipation and modifying
the government’s stance on slavery to institute the war measures he thought most beneficial. At
the time, Curtin did not consider African Americans his equals. Most northerners felt much the
same way. The governor was well aware of this widespread opinion and thus addressed
emancipation in strictly strategic terms as beneficial to the welfare of the Union and its white
populace.
Only a year and a half prior, Curtin demonstrated that emancipation rhetoric was not
among his priorities. The Secession winter of 1860-1861 witnessed many last-minute measures
that failed to maintain the Union despite Curtin’s efforts. One such action included a proposed
constitutional amendment by Tennessee Governor Isham Harris that called for the protection in
perpetuity of slavery where it already existed, a concession some moderate Republicans were
willing to consider. 10 Curtin promptly forwarded the memorandum to the Pennsylvania
Legislature, hoping to garner support among the state’s representatives. Within two months,
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shortly following Lincoln’s own inauguration, Secretary of State William Seward submitted the
amendment in question to the states noting that Congress would have no “power to abolish or
interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof.” 11 Curtin alluded to his
support of such a measure to the legislature on March 20, explaining that, “the restoration of
fraternity and the concord amongst the States of our time-honored and beloved Federal Union,
which may result from your action, will, I rest assured, command for it your earnest and early
consideration.” 12 This last-ditch effort promoting pacification failed to gain steam, however, and
civil war began within a month.
Curtin’s notions of governance before the war included the willingness to compromise on
matters of sectional antipathy in order to guard the cultivation of free society. By revealing the
ability to empathize with ideological opponents in the South, Curtin believed he was
demonstrating the same political flexibility as the framers of the Constitution, and thus helping to
preserve the national compact they created in times of similar social unrest. War changed that
vision dramatically. He vowed to make no more concessions in regard to the “peculiar
institution.” In the governor’s view, striking at slavery, the “root of the rebellion,” became
perhaps the strongest moral measure in the war effort. To preserve the republic and prevent
future warfare, Curtin declared, the government had no other option but to liberate both minds
and the slaves. 13
Throughout the first year of the war, Curtin and fellow northern leaders looked on in
despair as the vast armies of the North were continuously defeated in the eastern theater of the
conflict. The summer of 1862 brought further disappointment at the gates of Richmond as Union
General George B. McClellan proved unable to seize the rebel capital. Even though he helped
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establish a massive federal training facility for troops at Camp Curtin in Harrisburg and created
the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, Curtin nevertheless sought to do more on behalf of the Union
Cause. But disaster ensued. “Now everything looks like a great defeat to the arms of the
Union,” Pennsylvania’s Columbia Spy despondently noted after yet another Federal debacle at
the Second Battle of Bull Run in August 1862. 14
In the wake of this string of military calamities, Republicans faced an equally daunting
predicament on the political front. With abolitionists and radicals demanding more attention to
emancipation efforts, moderates encouraging intensive focus on military measures, and anti-war
Copperheads decrying anything originating from Lincoln’s party, the pro-war coalition appeared
to be tearing at the seams. 15 Upheaval in the border states further complicated the issue.
Throughout the spring and summer of 1862, “President Lincoln made earnest and successive
appeals to the border states to accept compensated emancipation, which simply meant the giving
of them a fair consideration for their negroes in dollars and cents,” reported Philadelphia’s Daily
Evening Bulletin. 16 Lincoln’s liberal tactic of attempting to show border state slaveholders that
their own interests coincided with national interests failed dismally.
At the same time, Curtin was annoyed by abolitionists, whose rhetoric he regarded as
ineffective at keeping Copperheads at bay or maintaining general support of the war effort. The
governor yearned for alliances, not additional enemies. A Philadelphia advocate of Curtin’s
shared his leader’s sentiments in one public address, noting that, “[e]very inducement invokes us
to consolidate and co-operate [even with Democrats]. The comfort and necessities of our fellow
citizens in the field of war—the support of our patriotic President and our fearless Governor . . .
14
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call upon us to sink all considerations before the one absorbing duty of the hour” —military
victory. 17 In his own words, Curtin revealed a willingness to recognize “the spirit of concession
and compromise” for the greater good of Union and political cooperation. 18

“Liberal Comity”
Governors could be among the most intuitive collaborators in the Union’s cause. On September
6, 1862, the same day Harper’s Weekly noted the inability of legislators to cooperate, Curtin sent
a telegram to ten fellow northern governors in hopes of salvaging some political capital at a
dismal moment for the country. As Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia of 55,000 men
was lurking in western Maryland, preparing to spring into Pennsylvania and capture Harrisburg,
a rallying cry was needed. “In the present emergency,” Curtin wrote, “would it not be well if the
loyal governors should meet at some point in the border States to take measures for a more active
support of the government? An immediate answer is requested, that as early a day as possible
may be named for the meeting, if approved.” 19 At this desperate stage, Curtin was far more
concerned about bracing the authority of the federal government than he was about abolitionism.
Like Lincoln, Curtin viewed the latter option as politically viable only as a means to ensure the
former.
Within a matter of days, governors and representatives of thirteen northern states
consented to attend the conference, agreeing to meet in Altoona, Pennsylvania on September
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24.” 20 Governor Edwin Morgan of New York, the staunch conservative chairman of the
Republican National Committee for much of the conflict, refused to attend the suspicious
conference because he felt that the single best manner of supporting the war was to furnish state
troops only as they were requested by the federal government. 21 Such concerns over the
expansion of military power and jurisdiction were observed by Lincoln’s own Attorney General
Edward Bates, who noted that, “[t]here seems to be a general and growing disposition of the
military, wherever stationed, to engross all power, and to treat the civil government with
contumely, as if the object were to bring it into contempt.” 22 Curtin, however, believed that a
strong army was necessary to ensure the survival of civil government. He also subscribed to a
concept of “a liberal comity between the States,” recognizing that the cohesion of the loyal states
was a valuable strategic asset in the maintenance of national liberty. 23 The New York Tribune
echoed the sentiments regarding nationwide cooperation by noting that only through “the
cooperation of all friends,” from all states, could “the National cause” uphold the preservation of
“Universal Humanity.” 24
Like many citizens in the North, the governors were supportive of—yet frustrated by—
the slow progress of the Union’s military efforts. As all other strategic options evaporated, state
leaders adopted or encouraged policies that consolidated the federal government’s supremacy in
regard to both military and civil matters. In doing so, the liberal spirit that protected rights,
promoted economic opportunities, and motivated Republicans could be further safeguarded by a
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stronger national institution. For Curtin, bearing up federal authority was to weaken slavery—
and thus the Confederacy itself. Similarly, Governor Richard Yates of Illinois publicly asked
Lincoln to adopt “more decisive measures” to promote this agenda. Federal officers in the South
“should not be frittering away their time guarding the property of traitors, and the government
ought not to spurn the Negroes as soldiers.” Doing so would render “foreign intervention
impossible” and bring about “a speedy close” to hostilities, Yates contended. 25 On September
10, Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois insisted to fellow radical senator Zachariah Chandler of
Michigan, noting of the planned conference: “nothing will now save us but a demand of loyal
governors, backed by a threat, that a change of policy and men shall be made.” 26
With similar thoughts possibly in mind, Curtin and several of the anti-slavery governors
attending the conference sought to assert strategic and moral (albeit supportive) pressure on the
Lincoln Administration. By urging the legal abolition of slavery, by upgrading the military, and
by offering support to the beleaguered presidency, the governors hoped to alter the ongoing
political discourse through their meeting and proclamation. Their motives were both
“progressive and aggressive.” 27 However, few of them at that moment realized that Lincoln had
already set the wheels of emancipation into motion. Curtin and abolitionist governor of
Massachusetts John Andrew discussed the upcoming conference with Lincoln at the Executive
Mansion to clarify their purpose of endorsement for his administration. “In that interview,”
Curtin later recalled, Lincoln “did not attempt to conceal the fact that we were upon the eve of an
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Emancipation policy, and he had from us the assurance that the Altoona conference would
cordially endorse such a policy.” 28
Early in the war, Andrew suggested to Curtin the plan of initiating a John Brown-style
slave insurrection in Virginia to incite fear and menace the Confederacy. Curtin considered it a
barbarous proposal. “So far as I am concerned,” wrote Curtin, “this war will be conducted only
by civilized methods.” 29 Andrew was more than willing to help incite slave rebellion, but
moderate Republicans desperately wished to avoid such measures. On this occasion as well as
the upcoming conference, Curtin served as Andrew’s ballast of moderation. While they
ultimately desired the same goal, they frequently differed in how best to achieve it. Their
differences did not weaken, but strengthened their partnership, allowing them to have a broader
perspective on the issues at hand. But Andrew adopted a radical stance on abolition that
moderates did not agree to. These concerns were quite clear in Washington as the Lincoln
Administration pondered the release of a proclamation of emancipation in the fall of 1862.
Considering the multitude of recent military disasters, such a declaration would be perceived as a
drastic and frenzied signal of northern desperation. Secretary Seward recommended to Lincoln
that the proposed proclamation be shelved until a battlefield victory was achieved. Little did
many realize that moment would arrive sooner rather than later. 30
As the Army of Northern Virginia pushed closer to the Pennsylvania border, Curtin grew
increasingly distraught. Issuing a call for emergency volunteers under the command of General
John F. Reynolds in Harrisburg, Curtin accompanied the column of militia to Hagerstown,
Maryland. “Our people [are] responding to the call in a most wonderful manner,” the governor
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wrote Lincoln during the mobilization process (although the force of Pennsylvanians ultimately
refused to march into battle when asked by McClellan). 31 In Hagerstown, Curtin awaited word
on September 17 for the outcome of the nearby Battle of Antietam. Twelve hours of continuous
combat left 23,000 men dead, maimed, or prisoners of war. Lee’s force escaped to the relative
safety of Virginia during the following evening and Pennsylvania was temporarily safe from
invasion.
Curtin was moved by the carnage and bravery he witnessed during the Maryland
Campaign, reshaping his perceptions of the war through witnessing its costs firsthand. In an
address to the Pennsylvania Legislature, he noted of these sacrifices, “Having accompanied this
force to Hagerstown, I am enabled to speak of the courage, fidelity, and cheerfulness with which
the men suffered unaccustomed privations, and bore the fire of the rebel force, performing with
alacrity all the service that was required of them.” 32 But for Curtin, support for those in the
military needed to move beyond mere laudatory rhetoric and offer physical, financial, and moral
comfort. One of the core ideals of Curtin’s liberalism constituted tenets of justice, not simply for
common individuals but for those who had earned the right in battle. 33
The protection and good health of soldiers and their loved ones was very much on
Curtin’s mind as the war progressed. But perhaps most importantly for him, the losses of
Antietam and the war as a whole required a vindication of the Union cause. Struck down in the
prime of their lives, those who perished at Antietam were representative of the Union’s citizenry
in all their social, geographical, and political diversity. Their diverse nation, pledged to offering

31

“Andrew G. Curtin to Abraham Lincoln, Sunday, September 14, 1862 (Telegram concerning military affairs),”
accessed November 15, 2011. American Memory Collections. The Library of Congress.
<http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=mal&fileName=mal3/434/4342000/malpage.db&recNum=0>.
32
Curtin quoted in Reed, 456.
33
Richard Schneirov, Labor and Urban Politics: Class Conflict and the Origins of Modern Liberalism in Chicago,
1864-97. (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1998), 5.

45
opportunity to its citizens, was worth preserving. These sentiments resonated with the governor
as he proceeded by train from Harrisburg to Altoona in late September. The upcoming
conference had to illustrate the Union’s strategic and moral goals as perfectly evident and
absolutely necessary.
The decisive victory of Antietam altered the political situation of two weeks earlier when
Curtin transmitted conference invitations to his fellow governors. Lee’s repulse from Maryland
offered Lincoln much-needed political clout and, as he had promised Secretary Seward, he
released the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation on September 22 in the wake of Union
military success. 34 Furthermore, the demands of radical Republicans and governors who yearned
for slavery’s end reached new and intense levels. Even with midterm elections looming, Lincoln
and Republicans felt they could finally act. 35 Like some of the loyal governors, abolitionists
such as William Lloyd Garrison and Frederick Douglass simultaneously scoffed and praised the
Proclamation. Although the document was far from their ideal vision, it was nevertheless “a
major step toward a millennium of liberty” in which slavery would be expunged. 36
While the president embraced the governors’ motion of support, he also hoped to avoid
being preempted by so-called radicals advancing emancipation measures. Lincoln therefore felt
he was not beyond influencing the terms of debate at the conference. A Harper’s Weekly
columnist astutely noted of Lincoln’s acumen for political canniness: “The conservative
Republicans think him too much in the hands of the radicals; while the radical Republicans think
him too slow, yielding, and half-hearted.” 37 Curtin, standing between these two ideologies,
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perhaps more than anybody realized how true that judgment was. The governor did not seek to
convey a radical message in support of emancipation from the conference, but radicals such as
Andrew did.
The president may have had the last laugh on the matter. His release of the preliminary
proclamation the day before the meeting offered him a three-fold political advantage. Lincoln at
last had an opportunity to issue the Proclamation in the aftermath of military success, he tactfully
limited how radical the message of the governors could be regarding war aims, and he discreetly
ushered them into a corner to support the Proclamation as he deemed fit, knowing that the
entourage of governors would still be supportive. 38 Subsequently, though the governors were
joyous that some emancipation policy had been adopted, emotions were nevertheless mixed,
especially amongst the radicals. 39 Andrew read the Proclamation in a newspaper aboard a train
in transit to Altoona and later noted, “It is a poor document, but a mighty act; slow, somewhat
halting, wrong in its delay till January, but grand and sublime after all.” 40
Curtin’s reaction was less poetic and more pragmatic. In an October 1863 interview in
his Bellefonte home, a Harrisburg correspondent recorded Curtin’s reflections on the
emancipation situation. Curtin recognized that “peace men” and Democrats in the North
predicted southern victory and “that the Government could never crush rebellion.” They viewed
the government as weak, ineffective, and uncoordinated. The governor sought to disprove their
judgments. But as the states and their governors began collaborating, “these same peace men
were urging that the war was for the negro—that the struggle was for the emancipation of the
slave. If the struggle does bring a ray of light and hope to the slave, the owner had himself to
38
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thank.” Slavery was “the cause of [the South’s] calamities” and Curtin revealed no qualms over
ex-slaves making the best of their situation. But ultimately, he “sincerely believed that all which
was wanted now effectually to crush [the] rebellion, was vigorous measures on the part of the
Government and active support from the people.” 41 The Governors’ Conference embodied this
tenet to the limit.
To help assure the survival of American democracy, Curtin felt a resounding
demonstration of support for the president and the military in a great hour of need was
warranted. “I shall be ready to perform any duty that may be required of me in such an
emergency,” Curtin wrote Stanton earlier that month. 42 Support of the preliminary Emancipation
Proclamation and conference marked a political point of no return for Curtin. As he declared a
month following the Proclamation’s formal release: “There can be but two parties in the
North—those who are in favor of the Government, and those who are against it.” 43 Support of
emancipation ultimately served as a determining factor in the judgment of loyalty.
Discussing and debating emancipation well into the night of September 25 in Altoona’s
Logan House Hotel, the governors finally reached a consensus in the early morning hours and
agreed to travel to Washington to discuss their proceedings in person with Lincoln. Andrew took
notes during the deliberations and spent nearly half an hour modifying the preamble until most of
the governors could agree on its language. When it came time for the executives to affix their
signatures, all did so with the exception of Maryland’s Augustus Bradford. The leader of the
slave state (and a Democrat) feared the repercussions of associating himself with prominent
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Republicans. “Gentlemen, I am with you in heart and soul, but I am a poor man, and if I sign
that address, I may be a ruined one,” he confessed to them. 44
When all was completed, a communiqué was sent via the hotel’s telegraph office to the
president that included the governors’ declaration. Lincoln replied with an invitation for the
gathering to conclude at the Executive Mansion. 45 The radicals hoped this personal meeting
with the president would also allow them to present their case against the Democrat McClellan
that was absent from their written address. 46 For three hours the following day, the thirteen
governors met with Lincoln, discussing their thoughts from the conference, their support of
emancipation, and for some, their displeasure with McClellan. Perhaps fearful of inciting
dispute within the Army of the Potomac as well as within the government, the governors largely
kept their complaints and opinions of McClellan to the confines of Lincoln’s office. And like
Curtin, Lincoln was unwilling to kick the hornet nest and relieve McClellan at that moment.
Little Mac was granted one more reprieve, but ultimately squandered his final chance and was
sacked on November 5, 1862. His attempts to publicly warm up to powerful Republicans like
Curtin could no longer shield him.

“Assurances of Protection”
The declaration issued by the state leaders was generous toward Lincoln and his policies,
ensuring support of the republic that defended the rights they desired for all citizens. Placing
aside some of their desires for more proactive emancipation measures, the governors
nevertheless recognized the necessity of reinforcing their president in an hour of need. While all
of these leaders expressed different means of politicking, they were all aware that fusing together
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their strategies was a sure means of developing interstate and national cooperation on behalf of
the military’s efforts. The governors asserted the need for an additional 100,000 men in the
army, a goal that was difficult to achieve in the wake of further defeats in the subsequent
months—a factor that foreshadowed the approaching Conscription Act of March 1863.
The governors requested a strengthening of the military because the liberal theory that
many observed recognized that force was sometimes necessary “to protect the weak against the
strong” in a state of war already extant. 47 And such was exactly Curtin’s response to slavery by
late 1862. Liberals sought their own sense of justice, but could also flex their collective muscle
in instances of war and defense. They also supported Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus, issued on the same day as the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. Although Curtin
was hesitant to enforce suspension as he felt it infringed upon personal liberties, he eventually
concurred with the president on the issue (as he did in nearly all matters). One year after the
Governors’ Conference, Curtin wrote to Lincoln: “The proclamation suspending the writ of
habeas corpus is a heavy blow but as it is right we can stand it.” 48 Such was war.
The opening paragraphs of the governors’ declaration expressed sentiments with which a
majority of northern citizens agreed. The document argued that the “loyal and cordial support”
of the government was necessary so that “the constitutional rights and liberties of the people
themselves can be saved from the wreck of anarchy or from the gulf of despotism.” 49 Linked to
the ideals of the American Revolution, liberalism was explicitly associated with these sacred
ideals of liberty and virtue. For many, this liberty was the purpose of Union, and over time, the
rights afforded by Union could be extolled to humankind. Consequently, that Union absolutely
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needed to be upheld. In the right atmosphere, “liberal idealism” and “patriotic nationalism” had
the potential to unite “Americans of all sections at the highest levels of political conviction.” 50
These doctrines drove Curtin and his fellow governors to support and assert the policy of
emancipation to sustain the national Union. Liberalism helped guarantee that “American
nationalism, self-government, and property were all part of the same package” and that the
nation as a whole “could long endure.” 51
Whereas the first segments of the “Address of Loyal Governors” embraced unity,
political cooperation, and a general sense of patriotic and obligatory rhetoric, the latter portions
were something far different in nature. Curtin perceived the government’s right to establish
military law in the South implied “the right and the duty of the government to liberate the minds
of all men living therein by appropriate proclamations and assurances of protection.” In
reinforcing the Lincoln Administration’s claims for a broad construction of executive power, the
governors were also lending support to the government he was attempting to maintain.
Ensuring such liberties would allow men who were “capable, intellectually and morally,
of loyalty and obedience . . . not to be forced into treason as the unwilling tools of rebellious
traitors.” Therefore, to allow slavery to continue to exist was a crime and thus “unjust to the
loyal people whose . . . lives are made a willing sacrifice on the altar of patriotism.”
Discrimination of that magnitude would have been a slap in the face to “the wife who is
compelled to surrender her husband . . . in favor of rebel masters permitted to retain their slaves.
It would have been a final decision alike against humanity, justice, the rights and dignity of the
government, and against sound and wise national policy.” 52 Their words spoke of reinforcing
the traditional sense of contract theory. If combatants were to give of themselves for the higher
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purposes of Union, that government owed them affirmations of dual allegiance. Emancipation
demonstrated such support because it would enable Union victory. In doing so, Curtin and
fellow liberals transformed prewar economic ideologies into military and social measures meant
to brace the efforts of soldiers. Yet many northerners initially failed to recognize this deeper
humanitarian mission of emancipation initiatives proposed by government.
As with the Emancipation Proclamation itself, these words left most whites unconvinced
that blacks were their equal. 53 Less than two years earlier, New York City’s Anglo-African
newspaper declared that “[u]nder the guise of humanity” the Republican party’s “opposition to
slavery means opposition to the black man, nothing else.” 54 Furthermore, “the standard by
which [many] Republicans measured the black man’s alleged imperfect humanity was the white
man’s alleged near perfect humanity.” 55 But this racial argument was beyond the point for a
majority of northerners, including Curtin. As Illinois officer James Connolly wrote, loyalists did
not fight for money, power, or fame but “for the idea of Union, Freedom, an intangible
something always sought for by mankind, often fought for and never appreciated when
possessed.” 56 But Lincoln and Curtin did appreciate that “intangible,” and they desired to grant
its survival in perpetuity. Although whites thought of blacks as lesser forms of humanity,
humanitarian sensibilities were nevertheless key themes in the perceptions of the liberal legacy.
“The war,” argued Frank Leslie’s Illustrated, “was not a contest for supremacy and territory, but
a conflict for the maintenance of national integrity and the destruction of a rebellion against law,
order, and the dictates of humanity.” 57
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Public reactions to the conference were numerous and mixed. Despite the document’s
rhetorical parameters, opponents denounced the “radicalism” of the governors’ message. “Wise
as this measure was, and successful in its ultimate consequences,” noted a biographer of Indiana
Governor Oliver P. Morton, the conference’s “immediate political result was disastrous. Party
conflicts, which had been smothered in the general enthusiasm [of the war], were now revived
with great bitterness. Regardless of the conference, increasing Republican support for
emancipation at national and state levels ushered violent protest by Democrats who argued the
war was losing its focus.” 58 Illustrating these emotions was the New York Herald, which called
the meeting a “treasonable . . . plot that had been set afoot by the radicals . . . to abolish the
Union, the constitution, and Negro slavery together, without regard to legal, moral or social
obstacles.” 59 Many Americans did not agree that emancipation would help bring a speedy end to
the war, and thus were highly unwilling to accept the emancipationist revision of the Union’s
war aims.
The governors’ address was sent by Andrew to fellow state executives who did not attend
the conference. Of them, the leaders of Connecticut, Kansas, Minnesota, Oregon, and Vermont
expressed their approval. The governors of Delaware, Kentucky, Missouri, New Jersey, and
New York—all slaveholding or Democratic states—declined or flatly rejected the
announcement. Curtin realized that emotions were heated. 60 “I did not then doubt,” he confided
to friend Alexander McClure after the war, “that it would lose us the coming election in
Pennsylvania . . . but I believed that the country then knew what the war was about, and that it
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was time to bring slavery to the front as the great issue.” 61 If the governor truly felt this
sentiment at the time, his forecast was partially correct.
In the midterm election of that year, Democrats gained three seats in the Senate and half
of the two-dozen Pennsylvania seats in the United States House of Representatives, giving
Democrats control of the House. Capitalizing on the fatigue of recent military defeats and antiabolitionism, Democrats claimed their most substantial triumph in years. 62 Loyal Democrats
wanted no deviation from the original goal of preserving the Union. For many of them,
becoming embroiled in slavery issues was an infuriating distraction. Even two years following
the conference, men such as Unionist Party representative Robert Mallory of Kentucky declared,
“I say, Mr. Speaker, that it was that meeting of the factious governors at Altoona, and the
pressure they then brought to bear, and had previously with others brought to bear, on the
President of the United States . . . that caused him to abandon his original policy.” 63
Copperheads claimed the meeting was a coup d'état to replace Lincoln with the radical
John Frémont. They referred to the conference as “A Second Hartford Convention” devised by
the “Disloyal Governors of the Loyal States.” 64 Republican newspapers retaliated by exclaiming
that Democrats making such accusations were “wretched culminators” guilty of
“counterrevolution and anarchy.” The “Vallandigham press” was notorious for casting such
“foul and infamous aspersions” upon the noble efforts of dedicated Republicans, they declared. 65
In the ensuing months, Democratic papers continued to attack Curtin for his supposed “advocacy
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of negro emancipation, equality, and fraternity.” The Lancaster Intelligencer asked, “[s]hall we
be overrun by this horde of semi-barbarians . . . ? Curtin is for this.” 66
Democratic-affiliated Union soldiers were outraged by the purported tone of the
conference and any measure promoting emancipation. Many bemoaned “fearfully” regarding the
collaboration of “Abolition” governors, perhaps knowing that many of them advocated
McClellan’s dismissal. As one Yankee recruit noted, scores of troops “believe with all their
hearts and minds in McClellan . . . and are unwilling to be slaughtered in the experiment of
muddle headed politician generals” in the name of emancipation. 67 Some men in the 106th
Pennsylvania Infantry were “boldly stating that they would not have entered the army had they
thought such would be the action of the government.” 68 Meanwhile, Pittsburgh’s Peace
Democrats responded to the alarms of emancipation by establishing the Democratic Club—a
political organization to counter Pennsylvania Republican Union Leagues.
The opposition of constituents and many soldiers shows that the Governors’ Conference
failed to some degrees in its hopes of rallying the people on behalf of the nation’s war aims and
strategies. Historian Allan Nevins went so far as to editorialize that, “[m]isrepresentations of the
conference . . . persisted, and it had better never been held.” 69 Curtin, however, considered his
own initiatives in this endeavor, especially the Altoona conference, as “one of his happiest
efforts” in sustaining the republic. 70 John Andrew too subscribed to the worthiness of the dual
mission of the Governors’ Conference and the Union: “Wisdom will still live when all of this
generation has gone under the dust; and the people, country, and humanity, will live when [we]
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all . . . have been forgotten and lost, even to history.” 71 The ideals of democracy supplied
through Unionist strength were universal features governors hoped could be extended to all
citizens of all generations and places. For Curtin, the fate of the war involved nothing less than
deciding the fate of mankind. With thorough and strategic measures, Curtin declared at one
rally, “we will prove this the strongest Government ever conceived by the mind of men, and our
children and our children’s children, for generations to come, will enjoy all the blessings which
our fathers bequeathed to us.” 72 The military that reinforced government was the surest way to
maintain Curtin’s goals and national promises.
Like many of their governors stated in the Altoona proclamation, some soldiers grasped
the concept that the “institution of slavery was antithetical to republican government, and that
any republican government that tried to accommodate slavery was doomed to eventual failure.”
As a result, claimed a member of the 3rd Wisconsin Infantry, “the rebellion is abolitionizing the
whole army.” 73 While that claim may have been too broad to categorize an entire fighting force,
it certainly spoke to the “ordered change” and new attitudes toward emancipation within the
army. The entrenched southern aristocracy threatened democratic institutions, and Federal
troops quickly realized it. Curtin and the governors recognized that while loyal white citizens
were sacrificing of themselves for the Constitution and nation, many southerners continued to
garner the economic benefits of slavery. The liberties that Republicans promised to citizens
were significantly compromised. “War means desolation and death,” Curtin confided to a crowd
of supporters the previous June. “The rebels have set up the standard of revolt, and are striking
at the liberties of a great people, and the history of the world, both sacred and profane, proclaims
71
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they shall suffer death. The time has now come when the lives and the property of the rebels will
be used to break down this most unholy rebellion. [Immense applause].” 74
But the ability of men to engage in this endeavor was sometimes determined by the color
of their skin. Andrew Curtin—the governor heralded as the “Soldier’s Friend,” the leader who
brought northern leaders to marry a policy of emancipation to one that supported executive
authority, was not welcoming of African American troops. At the war’s outbreak, many of
Philadelphia’s 22,000 African Americans were eager to muster into service. But Curtin, among
other governors, was hesitant to enlist black combatants into service for fear of political
backlash. Many black Pennsylvanians journeyed to Massachusetts to join regiments endorsed by
Governor Andrew. As recruitment numbers dropped, an ever-growing number of citizens
petitioned Curtin to make use of the large force of men willing to serve. Even one Irishman from
Philadelphia could not “see exactly why it is that the Negurs can’t go to the war” when their
white counterparts were being conscripted into service. 75
One month after the Emancipation Proclamation’s formal release, Frederick Douglass
wrote to Curtin, asking if he would at last accept Colored Troops for the cause. Curtin replied
that he would not. In Yates’ previously used phrase, Curtin “spurn[ed] the Negroes as soldiers.”
However, with the need for additional manpower, the subsequent Confederate invasion of
Pennsylvania that summer, and the insistence of Secretary of War Stanton, Curtin reconsidered
the roles of black troops. 76 Still, “[b]lack enlistment efforts met plenty of resistance . . . . Many
white soldiers—even liberal, antislavery ones—maintained decidedly racist views after” the
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arrival of black troops. 77 Perhaps the governor’s most revealing opinions of slavery and Union
during the war are exhibited in an October 6, 1863 campaign speech in Doylestown,
Pennsylvania, in which he noted, “It is common to say that this war is either for or against the
nigger. Well, my friends, it is but candid to admit that some of the most immense interests and
sacred principles revolve around the massive and woolly head of the nigger.” The slave owner,
“proud, and tyrannical, enjoying the unrequited labor of others,” stood up against the noble
institutions of the government. As a result, “[h]alf a million of their men have [been] stricken,”
Curtin stated. “The Government of the United States belongs to us . . . and slavery shall fall
beneath the majestic tread of that free Government.” 78
The Union was not responsible for war, the governor argued. Southerners brought war
upon themselves. “The fidelity and loyalty of our people will constitute one of the purest
chapters in the history of freedom. . . . Is the negro here by his own choice? He was taken from
Africa, where his home was found. The sweat of his face has poisoned the ground to the
slaveholder.” He told the crowd no white families had been slaughtered in slave uprisings in the
absence of their men. Meanwhile, during the New York Draft Riots, “mob turned to plunder,
rob, and murder the negro, merely because he was negro, the poor negro returned and collected
what was left.” Curtin claimed those rioters were “all friends” of Democratic Governor Horatio
Seymour. “I have no such friends,” Curtin boasted. “If in this struggle a ray of the light of
liberty gets into the brain of the poor negro, of what have we to complain? 79
Curtin’s speech is rife with the racism and paternalism that characterized most white
northerners of the era. Yet, his racial views also draw distinct lines in the sand against his
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southern opponents. “Negroes” were not property or beasts. They were human. Curtin’s
rhetoric expressed a deeply-engrained presumption that most of the “poor negroes” did not
exemplify intellect equal to that of the white man. However, Curtin also believed such
categorizations should not have excluded the black man from the decency of humanity or certain
rights. In its most simplified terms, slavery represented death, not only the demise of singular
human individuality and liberty, but the democratic institutions that cultivated free civilization.
The governor also came to recognize the right of African Americans to contribute to the defense
of society. The praiseworthy actions of black militiamen and troops at Milliken’s Bend, Port
Hudson, and Battery Wagner revealed the worth of blacks as combatants, reinforced
emancipationist ideology, and contradicted the doctrine of both Copperheads and
Confederates—points all of which Republicans were quick to highlight to the general public. To
ignore the goals of Federal soldiers in favor of Copperheads “was tantamount to treason” in the
eyes of Republicans and an increasing number of northerners. 80
In the 1863 election season, Curtin was prompt to correlate his upgraded political
convictions to the recent contributions of African Americans on the battlefront. “When the
rebels were on our soil,” he confided to a crowd, “I would have employed all agencies to drive
him off. I would have armed black and white, and yellow men; I would have equipped the
cloven-footed gentleman himself.” He also claimed to have “armed three hundred negroes”
(likely with shovels) to construct fortifications outside Harrisburg as rebels unsuccessfully
attempted to cross the Susquehanna downriver from the capital. In fact, these laborers performed
with such vigor—along equally paid white workers no less—that “gentleman cheered and ladies
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waved their handkerchiefs” in gratitude as the column passed through the city. 81 Enlisting in
vast numbers by late 1863, were not blacks also entitled to the benefactions of the governor
known widely as the “soldier’s friend?”
His moral intuition regarding black rights were repressed by fears of political culpability.
This sentiment was expressed by Harrisburg’s Daily Patriot as rebel invasion loomed.
“Pennsylvania was afraid to allow the niggers to help her,” the newspaper stated. Eager black
recruits were forced to formally enlist in Massachusetts. “Governor Curtin,” the paper
continued, “would like to call upon the colored element about now, but dissent [sic]—he
couldn’t see his way clear to the Pennsylvania vote if he chucked the nigger between him and the
prejudices of the white element; politics had pulled the wool over the gubernatorial eyes”—
restraining the governor’s liberalism. 82 As the conflict progressed, Curtin’s views on the subject
continued to change. By war’s end, Curtin demonstrated his ideological flexibility yet again
during an 1866 journey to his hometown. There he “referred to the war as having its origin in
human slavery.” He continued by “terming the American people a nation of Abolitionists.
Proclaimed all men equal before the law.” 83 Curtin needed only to examine his own perceptions
to see how profoundly the Union changed during his tenure.
The circumstances of the Altoona collaboration may have marked the beginning of
Curtin’s personal and political transformation. The Address of Loyal Governors (co-authored by
Curtin) spoke volumes about the Union war effort as it was and what it was to be.
Complimenting the Emancipation Proclamation with moral and forceful rhetoric, the governors’
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declaration was indicative of the evolving forms of liberalism Curtin embraced in the dual names
of humanity and Union. The Emancipation Proclamation was a legal document, largely devoid
of moral rhetoric and meaningful prose. But Curtin was among numerous Republicans who
realized the inner meaning of Lincoln’s law. The Proclamation was in fact “a fit and necessary
war measure for suppressing said rebellion” and served as a foundation ensuring all citizenry
would be “forever free.” How was such an action not a moral one? 84
By publicly denouncing slavery’s dangers to democracy, Curtin embodied the growing
antipathy toward the peculiar institution. The governor’s activism encouraged (and even
demanded) dynamic government action in ending slavery, bolstering the military, facilitating
interstate cooperation, and conveying proactive support of Lincoln policies—methods that
continued to become more inclusive as the war carried on. Curtin implemented such actions
“believ[ing] that the blood of the heroes who have already fallen, and those who may yet give
their lives to their country, will not have been shed in vain.” Indeed, more blood would be shed
in the years following the Emancipation Proclamation, but the carnage was necessary in
preserving “the hope of humanity.”
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Chapter 3
“The Soldier’s Friend:”
Andrew Curtin and Military Welfare
Mrs. John Harris was aghast by the sights that greeted her as she rode into the desolate and
drenched fields surrounding Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Having accumulated medical supplies
and nursed the wounded on countless battlefields, Harris was rarely witness to carnage so
complete and psychologically debilitating. A veteran member of the Ladies’ Aid Society, she
still expressed difficulty in comprehending the scope of what she saw. “Am full of work and
sorrow,” she despondently wrote during an interlude from her medical duties. “The appearance
of things here beggars all description,” she continued. “Our dead lie unburied, and our wounded
neglected. Numbers have been drowned by the sudden rising of the waters in the creek bottoms,
and thousands of them are still naked and starving. God pity us!—pity us!” 1 On July 9, 1863, a
mere five days after Robert E. Lee’s invading Army of Northern Virginia fled Pennsylvania,
Harris wrote Governor Curtin of the scene that remained at the ravaged crossroads town:
“Gettysburg [July] 9, 1863
Gov. Curtin – [Illegible]
Surgeons greatly needed. Our own men neglected. The conditions of Rebels a disgrace to
humanity. Fifty of our own men and Rebel dead are unburied, eaten by worms near the 2nd
Division 2nd Corps hospital. What does it mean?
Mrs. John Harris” 2
Indeed, such was a question thousands of Americans were asking themselves by summer 1863.
What was to come of all this death and tumult? Was the reunification of the country or the
abrogation of slavery truly vindicated by the cost of such measures? As the third summer of the
conflict marked new highs and lows, Curtin attempted to answer these questions for his
1

Frank Moore, Women of the War; Their Heroism and Self-sacrifice. (Hartford, CT: S. S. Scranton & Company,
1868), 201.
2
Telegraph from Harris to Curtin. Military Dispatches Books, 1861-1866. Pennsylvania Historical & Museum
Commission, Pennsylvania State Archives. File Box July 9-31, 1863. The first name of Mrs. John Harris is an
uncertainty but the historical record suggests she served as a nurse at Manassas, Chancellorsville, and other major
campaigns of the war. I have inserted some slight punctuation in her telegraph so as to make it more cohesive.

62
concerned constituents. He did so by explaining the human costs of war as necessary to protect
the values of the nation. The governor’s personal ideology continued to shift as these military
losses expanded. The liberal spirit to which he ascribed once meant cultivating a government
and society in which the autonomous individual could plant the seeds of his own success in a fair
and economically viable atmosphere. By the third year of the Civil War, however, Curtin
realized that protecting personal agency was not enough to either sustain or reward a large
percentage of the Union’s common soldiers or their deprived families. Desperate times did call
for assertive measures. The government was not about to abandon the needs of its most
deserving citizens.
Without the abilities to heal the wounds of war and make proper amends on the behalf of
combatants coincided with Curtin’s desires to establish new social standards. These actions
revealed the changing nature of liberal thought as it merged with conceptions of a new
nationalism. Pre-war ties between righteous citizenry and state were fortified out of necessity.
Reaching this goal not only required a bolstered defense of the army, but additional civic aid in
the forms of medical care, burials, and educations for burdened military families. The endeavor
invoked patriotic implications and ultimately helped foster a nation “for the people,” a phrase
that may have never been uttered at Gettysburg had it not been for Curtin’s deeds and sense of
obligation to the “gallant soldiers.” 3
In the year leading to Gettysburg, no amount of well-wishing, speeches, or patriotic
ceremonies could bolster the Union’s war efforts in the eastern theater. Curtin’s Pennsylvania
Reserves endured some of the worst of the combat—fighting in the unsuccessful Peninsular
Campaign to seize Richmond, helping to push the rebels from Maryland soil at Antietam, and
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briefly penetrating the firm bulwark of Confederate defenses at Fredericksburg that December.
As he had done at Antietam three months prior, Curtin once again headed efforts to secure
passage and medical care for Pennsylvania’s wounded. Curtin and a detachment of medical
workers departed Washington on December 19, 1862 for Falmouth, Virginia with the intention
of transferring the disabled. Initiatives headed by the governor revealed his longtime tendency to
micromanage Pennsylvania’s war efforts, a factor that possibly led to his downward spiral in
physical and mental health. That said, pro-Republican newspapers lavished attention upon his
works. In the view of The Press, Curtin “and his unceasing efforts in this humane undertaking
are worthy of all praise.” 4 The recovery and recuperation of maimed soldiers proved a daunting
but morally obligatory endeavor. As nurse Anna Morris Holstein reflected, humanity behooved
loyal citizens to work “zealously” on behalf of the wounded. “[We] worked because there was
irresistible impulse to do, to act.” 5
Caring for men scarred in battle expressed a civic religion, equal in patriotic significance
to voting and citizenship. Rehabilitating the nation also required rehabilitating the troops
afflicted in the process, restoring them as healed and active citizens to serve the nation in other
forms. These measures served as living memorialization to the individual soldier and a moral
testament to the society he defended. Harrisburg resident Kate Dean wrote to the organizers of a
soldier fundraiser in March 1863 that she was honored to offer her “humble services in the aid of
the common cause of our country . . . with that liberal spirit which will inspire me to continue in
rendering all the services in my power to aid and relieve the sufferings and sorrows of the
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wounded soldiers.” 6 For Curtin and dedicated citizenry, public spirit and charity coalesced as a
singular form of patriotic expression. But their work was far from over in 1862.
Rushing to Virginia once again following General Joseph Hooker’s defeat at
Chancellorsville in May 1863, the governor visited the camp of the 148th Pennsylvania (partly
recruited in Curtin’s home county) and learned of the regiment’s heavy losses, including the
wounding of personal friend Colonel James Beaver. “Many noble fellows known to him had
fallen,” admitted Captain Robert H. Forster of Curtin. “[M]any others were suffering from their
painful wounds; and withal there was no success to cheer and compensate” them in their
miserable condition. “Vain indeed were his efforts to cancel his sad emotions,” the captain said
of his governor who emotionally broke down. The “few that heard his touching and pathetic
words will ever forget it.” 7
The strain of war increased. Pandemonium gripped Pennsylvania in the ensuing weeks.
Seizing the initiative from his May victory, Robert E. Lee’s forces cloaked their movements
northward via Virginia’s Shenandoah Valley to initiate yet another invasion into the North.
Pennsylvania Railroad official Thomas Scott wrote Curtin with urgency on the night of June 15:
“Get up a strong proclamation, calling upon our people to rise at once. There is not a moment to
be lost. The rebels are moving in large force, and invasion cannot be checked excepting by
immediate action.” 8 Earlier that day, Lincoln issued his own proclamation requesting 100,000
militiamen, 50,000 of them from Pennsylvania, to help thwart the rebel advance.
Embarrassingly, Pennsylvania could not meet the bare minimum of troops asked of her. With no
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strong presence of a standing militia force, the commonwealth could muster only 8,000
“emergency men”—some four thousand fewer men than the State of New York supplied. 9 The
frantic search for men and materiel carried on. But even in these times of desperation, politics
could still remain supreme. When one southern Pennsylvanian telegraphed congressman and
Curtin antagonist Thaddeus Stevens inquiring how the government intended to halt the invasion,
the fiery Republican caustically replied, “send for [Curtin aide] McClure, he will stop them at the
first toll-gate.” 10
Although some Confederate columns came within a few miles of the Pennsylvania
capitol, the bulk of the Army of Northern Virginia became engaged at the crossroads community
of Gettysburg on July 1. The circumstances of the first day of battle did not bode well for the
Federals, including the death of Curtin’s acquaintance General John Reynolds. Pushed back to
high ground after losing the town, the Army of the Potomac settled in for the fight of its life.
Among those in the thick of battle was Curtin’s cousin, Brigadier General David McMurtrie
Gregg, who led a repulse of Confederate troops in a massive cavalry action east of town.
Receiving bits of news here and there, Curtin grew increasingly anxious over his state’s fate.
Even as battle raged some forty miles away on July 2, Curtin was still reaching out to fellow
northern governors in the hope of obtaining additional troops. He desperately wrote to Governor
Joel Parker of New Jersey that day asking, “[h]ow soon will you send forward more troops? I
cannot magnify the necessity for their presence at the earliest possible moment.” 11 When all was
said and done, Lee’s army was defeated. At least 10,000 corpses were strewn across the once
pastoral fields of Adams County. Another 30,000 were left maimed and bleeding in the
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torrential rainstorms that saturated the bleak fields on Independence Day. Both ecstatic and
shocked, Curtin telegrammed two Bellefonte colleagues, “Lee is routed and his army is in flight.
The pontoon he left at Williamsport destroyed and he cannot escape. The battles were terrible
and casualties large—very large but the victory is complete.” 12 Union victory was fulfilling, but
not as complete as Curtin had hoped, for Robert E. Lee had escaped again into Virginia.
The governor was correct in at least one assertion: the battle truly was terrible. As he had
after many major battles, Curtin began receiving letters and telegrams from constituents
inquiring about the fate of their loved ones in the military. Responding to Alfred Huidekoper of
Meadville, he stated, “I regret to say your nephew has lost an arm.” The triumph at Gettysburg
“has been achieved with the sacrifice of thousands of lives” in “the most desperate battles in
history,” Curtin said. 13 The fight was the bloodiest to take place in the history of the Western
Hemisphere but it also marked a turning point for the nation. The fighting set the stage for a
reinterpretation of the Union’s mission in the war, framing the conflict in moral terms of
commitment and perseverance. Lincoln’s words delivered on a brisk morning that November
consummated the highest ideals of that Union. Curtin’s deeds leading to that moment at
Gettysburg helped bring fruition to Lincoln’s meaningful prose.
But that day was still four months away.
In the meantime, the governor assisted in coordinating relief efforts for the beleaguered
Pennsylvania community inundated with bloodied combatants. The day after Lee began his
retreat toward the Potomac, Curtin wrote Surgeon General William Hammond in Washington:
12
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“You may be assured that our people will take the wounded to their homes and render every
assistance and help that the most careful nursing may demand, and that our public buildings can
be used as hospitals, to any extent.” 14 But with Federal surgeons woefully undermanned, help
was yet needed. Vivid descriptions of the scene were presented to Curtin through the many
letters of Mrs. John Harris. “In the name of our dying soldiers,” she pleaded, “I ask you to allow
competent surgeons to come here[.] Our dead are unburied and [the survivors] are living
destitute and neglected.” 15 In order to obtain an accurate picture of the situation, Curtin decided
to see the battlefield for himself.
Arriving via train by July 11 with a small caravan of assistants and officials, Curtin was
as taken aback by the slaughter as Harris was. As one report cited, visitors “were shocked and
the heart sickened at the sights that presented themselves at every step. . . . [men] left wholly
unburied. . . . And this, too, on Pennsylvania soil! Humanity shuddered at the sight, and called
aloud for a remedy.” 16 Touring the battlefield extensively, the governor sought to visit each
Pennsylvania unit he came across. Thomas V. Cooper, a hospital steward, later wrote, Curtin
“walked through the ranks of the wounded, now lying high upon the bank [of a creek], and again
I noticed his marvelous remembrance of names and localities. He could and did call fully onefourth by name, and when given the names of others he would cheerfully recall some family
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associate or incident” from the past. 17 Only weeks earlier, he visited Camp Curtin as the
Confederates approached, noting to the recruits, “I will not betray you.” 18 These same
sentiments may have been in his thoughts as he surveyed Gettysburg’s damage. The governor
expressed this obligation in the belief that the Union’s men were worthy of dedication in both
life and death. From a political standpoint as well as a moral one, necessity urged proper action.
A February 1862 measure passed by the Pennsylvania Legislature deemed as such, requiring care
for the state’s dead and wounded wherever possible. 19 Over 500 Pennsylvanians were killed in
the battle, and if word of their ill-treatment spread, the situation had the potential to cost Curtin
at the polls that fall. 20
The dead “traitors and rebels” with no “sentiment of patriotism,” however, would be
offered no such pledge by Curtin on the fields of Gettysburg. 21

The majority of Confederate

dead remained in their shallow graves for nearly a decade. 22 The “honored dead” did not include
these southerners and the ultimately successful cause Lincoln, Curtin, and northerners exalted
would render southern losses fruitless. 23 Despite the governor’s hopes that the wayward brethren
of the South would someday return to the national family, his compassion had its limits.
Gettysburg’s Star-Sentinel concurred to a degree, stating “common humanity” should permit
southerners to reclaim their dead but not to allow for their burials “in our around our own
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National Cemetery.” Furthermore, “our state,” the paper declared, “should not make the
purchase, nor should it be suspected.” 24
The idea for a soldiers’ cemetery on the battlefield originated among many, but most
prominently with two local, rival attorneys: David McConaughy and David Wills. Three weeks
after the fight, both lawyers sent individual letters to Curtin, posing possibilities to launch a
concerted effort to recover and bury the North’s dead. Wills, acting as Curtin’s agent in the
recovery, consolidated efforts by various states in gathering their lost men. Dr. Theodore Dimon
of New York had approached Wills and proposed the dead be “disposed in this burial place by
regiments and states with proper marks designating their graves.” 25 Wills and Curtin found the
proposition admirable and completely appropriate. Capitalizing on the idea, Curtin wrote Wills
on August 21: “Pennsylvania will be so highly honored by the possession within her limits of
this soldier’s mausoleum.” With the assistance of her sister states, it would be Pennsylvania’s
pride to help erect as “glorious a monument to patriotism and humanity, that it becomes her duty,
as it is her melancholy pleasure, to yield in every reasonable way to the wishes and suggestions
of the States.” The finished project would serve well for the “solemn uses of a national
sepulchre.” 26
As during the Governors’ Conference one year earlier, Curtin revealed his hopes for
bipartisan cooperation throughout the Soldiers’ National Cemetery construction and dedication.
He returned to Altoona once again to head an Interstate Commission with governors and
representatives from the North to discuss the plans he shared in an August letter to Wills.
According to William Saunders, the preeminent landscape architect chosen to design the burial
24
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ground, Curtin’s original intention was to ask the states “for their sanction to remove the dead at
the expense of Pennsylvania.” His gesture “was not favorably entertained,” for each state wished
to pay homage to the dead in their own way. Thus, at the 1863 Altoona conference, the multistate commission agreed to share the honor “to furnish a plan for the improvement of the
cemetery grounds.” 27 The burial site on Cemetery Hill was purchased for $2,475.87, paid in full
through the Pennsylvania Legislature at Curtin’s bequest. 28
Although the grounds remained in the care of the state until 1871, it was among the first
generation of national cemeteries in the truest sense—a serene memorial of contemplation filled
with the remains of loyal Unionists bounded by a common cause and a common fate. The
Union dead were buried among each other regardless of rank, class, or distinction. Northerners
understood the concept of the cemetery’s unique design, especially Curtin. As the dead were
being disinterred from their shallow graves, he pleaded to a crowd in Harrisburg to comprehend
the larger significances of the recent campaign: “[T]he Administration of the government of
Pennsylvania sinks into insignificance when compared with the great struggle in which we are
engaged for the vindication and supremacy the National Government—a struggle which involves
the preservation of the national life itself.” 29 Without a Union endowed by citizens’ access to
equality, that national life could never be sustained and the spirit that defined Curtin’s own
career could never be bequeathed to subsequent generations.
As the governor agreed with Saunders, the cemetery’s design was elemental in conveying
a visceral message to the grounds’ visitors. The semi-circular headstones sweeping across the
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face of Cemetery Hill served as awe-inspiring and terrible tangibles of remembrance. Single
graves embodied individualism—a concept key to liberals. At the same time, recognizing the
costs of war in totality served as an emotional and spiritual symbol of nationalist unity. 30 The
collective human price of these individuals as a whole denoted their gift to the betterment of
society. In return, a grateful nation laid them to rest with its highest honors. Northerners
realized the whole was greater than the sum of its parts, encapsulating the stark contrast and
greatest strength of the Union over the Confederacy.
Well into autumn, Curtin was still receiving letters and appeals from families as far away
as the Midwest who were continuing the search for lost family at Gettysburg. One personal plea
was from John Hazenmuller, who travelled to Harrisburg from Minnesota in the hopes of
speaking with the governor to find the remains of a fallen relative. The missing man was
Captain Louis Muller, who was shot through the skull in the fierce and costly charge of the 1st
Minnesota Infantry on July 2. Curtin sent the despondent Minnesotan off to the battlefield with a
note for Wills stating, “Please aid M. Hazenmuller in any way you can in finding the remains.”
Fortunately, Muller’s body was discovered on the field and was transported home for burial in
Bayport, Minnesota. Only twenty-six years of age when he met his untimely demise, Muller was
an immigrant from Switzerland and was wounded and promoted on multiple occasions
throughout his two years of service. 31 Once criticized for his ties to Know-Nothingism’s anti-
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immigrant views, during the war Curtin did not spurn immigrants as he once had done to African
Americans. 32
Proving their citizenship, immigrants such as Muller sanctified their civic
enfranchisement with blood. Curtin realized that foreigners-turned-soldiers were entitled to the
same opportunities his father enjoyed as an immigrant iron founder. As one editorialist wrote
years earlier, “A liberal spirit pervades the American republic in this nineteenth century; and
religious warfare, and sectarian bigotry can never become a successful or permanent element of
American politics.” 33 If immigrants and members of shunned denominations sought citizenship
and security, they should have been granted as much if they were willing to demonstrate loyalty.
Narrow-mindedness had no place in a society that sought domestic growth. By recognizing their
mettle at Gettysburg, Curtin accepted many immigrants into the folds of nationalism.

Campaigning for Union
Northerners believed that their mission was the one of pure democracy, liberty, and individual
rights. As a result, foreigners both domestic and abroad arrived at similar conclusions. In doing
so, America “demonstrated to the world the viability of liberal nationalism.” 34 Such was one of
many virtuous ideals Lincoln validated when he spoke of the “new birth of freedom” weeks later.
In the interim, however, Curtin needed to seize victory in an uphill re-election campaign.
Initially, Curtin had little desire to run for re-election given his poor health and the daily trials of
war, but Lincoln convinced him otherwise. Curtin’s gubernatorial opponent was the staunchly
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Democratic, anti-war advocate, and highly experienced state Supreme Court justice George W.
Woodward.
Circling the state on the campaign trail in the frantic months between Lee’s invasion and
the October election, Curtin spent an extended period of time in the western regions of the state
courting the votes of sailors on the coast of Lake Erie and stumping in the hardscrabble oil fields
of Warren and Crawford Counties. At a mass gathering on September 10, 1863 (the fiftieth
anniversary of Perry’s victory on Lake Erie), Curtin again alluded to the noble efforts of the
nation’s earliest generations by singling out a veteran seaman of the 1813 battle and lauding him
before the crowd of thousands. If citizens accepted the false promises of Democrats, Curtin
warned, the endeavors of current combatants as well as the decades-old efforts of this aged sailor
would have been to no avail. To support Woodward was to disfranchise the soldier, the governor
claimed. Woodward’s Pennsylvania Supreme Court “resolution endorsing and sympathizing
with Vallandigham” that limited soldier voting rights created hesitation amongst many Keystone
voters. 35 Curtin’s displeasure with Woodward opinions opposing Lincoln’s policies of
enlistment, conscription, and emancipation were grounded in distinct ideological convictions.
Curtin had relative ease in securing the support of Union troops in his re-election
campaign, as did Lincoln the following year. Whereas many Democrats sought to cease further
bloodshed in what they felt was an unwarranted conflict, Republicans did not want the nation’s
losses to be for nothing. Regardless of some initial discontent with emancipation measures and
mismanagement of the war, northern combatants also did not wish the agonies of their comrades
to be in vain. Curtin shared great anxiety with Union soldiers over such a dismal prospect, and
sought to convey this attitude to constituents. His September 1863 rally in Erie presented itself
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as an ideal venue to illustrate these concurrent perspectives. In a moving ceremony the tattered
colors of the 83rd Pennsylvania Infantry, a local regiment, were unfurled to the crowd before
Curtin. The brigade commander, Colonel Strong Vincent, was mortally wounded on the slopes
of Little Round Top on July 2, 1863. Upon his departure to the service, Vincent wrote his wife,
“If I live, we will rejoice over our country's success. If I fall, remember you have given your
husband to the most righteous cause that ever widowed a woman.” 36 Curtin would have agreed
with Vincent’s sentiments. Without a nation sustained by the righteous capacity for growth
through merit, civic and republican virtue could not survive. Vincent himself could not have
risen to his various posts in life had it not been for such ideals. The goals of a more perfect
Union could never endure if that union was indefinitely fragmented by civil war. 37
A shadow of the mighty regiment it once was, the remnant of the 83rd Pennsylvania was
under the leadership of Captain John Graham in autumn 1863. “Graham took ground openly in
favor of the Governor, and abjured the present Democratic organization, to which he had
[previously] belonged.” He was a Curtin man now, and intended to campaign for him
throughout Erie County. Clutching the shredded regimental colors, another veteran of the 83rd
who lost his leg in the Seven Days battles also converted to the Republican Party because its
local members elected him treasurer of the county. As Philadelphia’s Press touted, “Such are the
examples that will go to the people as substantial proofs of the generosity of the Republican
party, and as a substantial rewards for the brave and self-sacrificing” soldiers committed to
maintaining the national Union. 38 Such accolades reflected Curtin’s philosophy regarding
soldiers. All Federal troops, dead and alive, were entitled to benefits and recognitions befitting
36
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their contributions. Nurturing opportunity and demonstrating concern for the plight of troops
and their families became an ethical duty equal in worthiness to military recruitment. State
welfare was required to heal the visible as well as invisible wounds of war in the name of
rebuilding the shattered nation. Times of brutal yet necessary inhumanity simultaneously called
for rehabilitating instances of compassion. Curtin, the “Soldier’s Friend,” accepted this fact with
conviction.
Many in the ranks were willing to corroborate Curtin’s unofficial title of “friend.” As a
soldier of the 11th Pennsylvania Cavalry exclaimed in an editorial in Wellsboro, Pennsylvania’s
Agitator, “The soldier points to Andrew G. Curtin as his friend, who has striven to make his
pathway as pleasant as may be; with the other hand he indicates Judge Woodward as his enemy
who has attempted to snatch from us that right sacred to every citizen of the United States.” In
the cavalryman’s view, the perceived tactics of Woodward and his allies “disenfranchised”
soldiers and deprived “them of the right of suffrage,” reducing “them to mere machines
propelled at the discretion of the their master like the slave.” 39 Likewise, Harrisburg’s Evening
Telegraph opined, “The soldiers in the Mexican war were allowed to vote because that war was
waged to benefit slavery. The soldiers in the war against rebellion have been disenfranchised
because the rebellion is carried on for the benefit of slavery.” 40
Outbursts were frequent in the Republican press in the weeks prior to the 1863 election,
painting Woodward as a contemptible judge who despised the Union and hated any soldier who
fought for it. These rumors, combined with Curtin’s genuine efforts on the soldiers’ behalf,
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provided the governor an edge in a narrow race. The political hype achieved convincing results,
even on troops who did not have the ability to vote. Pennsylvanians incarcerated in the hellish
confines “in the Libby Prison at Richmond observed the Election Day, and opened the polls
accordingly. There were 114 votes cast of which Curtin received 96, Woodward 18, scattering
1.” 41
Pennsylvania troops could not legally vote unless they found themselves on leave in their
home state, but through their informal ballots cast in camps and prisons they desired to interject
their views into the discourse of the election. 42 Private William Williams wrote, “I would like to
see Cirtain a lecting again. I think we can’t git a better man then he is.” Williams hoped to show
those Democrats “a trick or two.” 43 Woodward’s fallout with many in the military may have
been due to his ardent states’ rights principles above anything else. Notions of state sovereignty
did exist in the North, but other than a smattering of state judges who possessed little jurisdiction
outside the courts, few sensible northern politicians invoked the phrase to limit the flexibility of
the government or its soldiers. Nevertheless, most citizens above the Mason-Dixon Line were
nationalists, sometimes states’ rights nationalists, but most often Union advocates who believed
the nation had the rights and the means to save itself from dissolution. 44
Looking beyond political advantage, Curtin pursued a course that empowered
government and its combatants. His sense of nationalism, though earnest, could still be
unrelenting toward opponents. He possessed little fear of slandering pundits and politicians with
differing governing convictions or partisan motivations. “I cannot understand that bogus loyalty
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which professes loyalty to the Government and yet refuses to support the President,” Curtin
stated. “I have repeatedly said, and I say it now, that the man who, by word or deed, holds back
his fellow man from joining the armies of the Republic, and filling up their diminished ranks, or
who in any way obstructs the execution of the national will in this war, is a traitor.” 45
Concurrent with decades of campaign tactics, those not supporting the war were depicted
as not supportive of the troops in the field. Republicans embraced this ploy with great ferocity in
1863 and 1864. Soldiers were incensed by rumor of dissent at home. “It is justice to the soldier
that every traitor in the North be muzzled,” members of the 148th Pennsylvania editorialized.
“We want no fire in the rear. We are willing to fight the solid legions and the guerillas of the
South, but not the gorillas of the North.” 46 Likewise, the majority of Republicans were
unwilling to contemplate, let alone abide by, Democratic impositions. Settling for some
derivative of the perfected Union Republicans desired was nothing less than insult to severe
national injury. Northerners in the field also realized this fact. However, soldier displeasure
with Democrats did not always equate to their disavowal of them. Soon realizing that the
sanctity of a restored Union combined with the necessary extinction of slavery was, in the words
of historian Chandra Manning, “above politics,” many Democrats increasingly picked their
fights elsewhere. But some soldiers considered the heated political process a natural component
of the democracy they were defending. 47 They recognized the fact that their deeds not only had
the power to save the nation, but also create it anew. As Secretary of the Senate John W. Forney
declared at a Curtin rally in 1863: “This is a struggle for all time—not for to-day or to-morrow,
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or next year, but for all coming years. 48 The Civil War was ultimately invoked as a deliverance
of mankind, even to men not yet born. Recognizing all governments were flawed to varying
degrees, Curtin consistently urged the need to “proclaim to all the world that this Government,
the best one that was ever made, is to be sustained by power.” 49
While Curtin savored widespread support among Pennsylvania troops, he was far from
relishing in universal approval from them. One private camped near Warrenton, Virginia wrote
Gettysburg’s Compiler that Curtin being depicted as the “soldiers’ candidate” was nothing more
than pure “balderdash.” The infantryman contended, “[t]he Abolition wing of the honored sons
of Pennsylvania support Andy; but the large, conservative, Democratic wing jump over Andy,
and go in for the great statesman, Geo. W. Woodward for Governor.” 50 These words illustrated
the beliefs of a contingent of Federal soldiers who grew increasingly frustrated with the revised
war aims and tactics of the Union, especially those methods including emancipation. Civilians
on the home front expressed similar anger regarding conscription. “I think the organization to
resist the draft in Schuylkill, Luzerne and Carbon Counties is very formidable,” Curtin wrote
Stanton of discontent miners following the passage of the Militia Act in 1862. “I wish to crush
resistance so effectively that the like will not occur again,” he concluded. 51 Curtin faced similar
dilemmas in the state’s anthracite region, where the already beleaguered Irish immigrants were
especially angered with the changing face of the political situation. “The draft will make misery
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in many families,” said miller Isaac B. Taylor in a letter to Curtin. If he lost his son, he would be
broke, Taylor admitted. 52
Frustrated over the draft and emancipation, workers had no qualms in resisting
conscription and federal authorities. Seeking shelter with complicit neighbors, they evaded
provost marshals and established tightly knit bands of dissention. The end results were
tantamount to some of the deadliest draft resistance in U. S. History. Curtin viewed the uprisings
as nothing less than dastardly conspiracies to undermine the Union at home. 53 Like Woodward
and other Democrats, resisters did not subscribe to enhanced visions of liberalism and rejected
the empowered role of government in their local communities.
Curtin’s slim re-election victory on October 13, 1863 was a testament to this waning
enthusiasm for the war. Of over a half million votes cast, Curtin’s victory was determined by a
mere 15,000 ballots—less than half the margin of his election win three years earlier. 54 Not long
after Curtin’s second inaugural, a hotel owner in Philipsburg hoisted a banner above his
establishment that declared, “Death to Copperheads.” 55 As the election results revealed, the
commonwealth was truly split. One scholar describes Curtin’s dilemma on the home front as a
heated case of “imperfect nationalism” in which support for the war and Republicans was
anything but universal. 56 He felt their rebellious actions during the conflict inhibited the Union’s
military capacities. Such laborers received no sympathy from the governor who proclaimed the
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necessity of “protection to labor.” 57 If workers could not care for the welfare of the Union, that
same Union need not care for them. Support had to be mutual.
The same could not be said in some instances of the 1863 race. Curtin lost Adams
County and its county seat of Gettysburg by 228 votes, a rather embarrassing statistic
considering the level of work he committed to the community’s recovery. 58 He nevertheless
looked toward the dedication of the Soldiers’ National Cemetery with affection and solemnity.
Realizing that the burial ground’s creation eclipsed the individual prestige of Pennsylvania, the
“consecration” was a day of national recognition for all the states. The governor played a central
role throughout the process, as one reporter testified of the cemetery: “Its conception originated
with Governor Andrew G. Curtin, the fast and firm friend of the soldier, whom he assists in life,
and to whose noble memory, in death, he is among the first to pay a noble tribute.” 59

“A Noble Idea”
Pittsburgh’s Presbyterian Banner reported that Andrew Curtin “accomplished a good deed in the
part he acted toward the furnishing of a cemetery for the noble Americans who fell” at
Gettysburg. 60 The retrieval, identification, and final interment of the Union dead proved
depressing, but also reassuring to their families. Many found solace in the fact that their loved
ones died the good death in the name of the good cause. The cemetery exposed feelings of
reassurance and solace as much as it did loss and grief. 61 For Curtin, it was the “loyal and
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intrepid spirit” of the people that ultimately granted them victory in this consequential decision. 62
The vast undertaking required a reflection of those who had died and contemplation for those
who were yet to die.
Only hours before Curtin’s arrival in Gettysburg, the crowds of spectators funneling into
the town square begged Lincoln and Secretary Seward for speeches. The president, still
attempting to compose of his oration for the next morning, spoke only a few humorous words to
the carnival-like crowd from the David Wills home. Seward on the other hand, delivered a
frequently overlooked oration that evaluated the ongoing war as efficiently as anybody could.
Americans’ refusal to abolish slavery and “avert the catastrophe of civil war” in the young nation
was now “deluging it in blood.” He prayed for a swift end to the rebellion but above all, he
wished for citizens to realize “that this Union is a reality” and “that we owe it to our country and
to mankind that this war shall have for its conclusion the establishing of the principle of
democratic government.” 63 Like Seward, Curtin agreed that the United States and the war’s
outcome were indeed “the hope of humanity,” for Americans but also for citizens anywhere who
yearned for democracy and a fair share. At a formal banquet hosted by General Richard Busteed
in New York two weeks earlier, Curtin echoed the sentiments of Seward and his president. “We
must remember,” he argued, “that all of humanity is all of one family. It is made up of the living
and the dead, and those who have gone before us have shed their benefactions upon us by the
good works they have done.” 64 The ceremony on November 19 not only helped solidify this
Republican argument, it immortalized it.
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The presence of some 15,000 attendees at the cemetery ceremony at Gettysburg “testified
the devotion of the people to Liberty, their firm purpose to maintain it, and their profound
reverence for those who have already given their lives in its defence,” said one correspondent.
Papers wrote that the Union “has been for some time familiar with the fact, that the
establishment of the National Cemetery at Gettysburg for the interment of the remains of those
who fought and died in the memorable struggle of July, originated with Gov. Curtin. It was a
noble idea, prompted by the highest patriotism and holiest affection for the memory of the brave
and gallant men.” 65 The theme of the dedication embodied the words of Pericles, who over two
millennia earlier stated at the establishment of another military cemetery: “Comfort, therefore
not condolence, is what I have to offer to the parents of the dead who may be here.” 66 As writer
Gary Wills argues, a resting place for the dead had to be transformed into an outdoor classroom
for the living. 67
Realizing the significance of the day’s events, Curtin brought his twelve year-old son,
William, to witness the ceremonies and the speeches of Edward Everett and President Lincoln.
The father and son sat only paces away on the speakers’ platform as Lincoln rose to deliver his
“few appropriate remarks.” The concise oration struck a chord with Curtin. Lincoln’s
Gettysburg Address shared key beliefs and goals with the proclamation of loyal governors Curtin
wrote with Governor Andrew a year previously. The governors’ collective statement
proclaimed, “We believe that the blood of the heroes who have already fallen, and those who
may yet give their lives to the country, will not have been shed in vain.” 68 In 1863, even more so
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than in 1862, Republican stalwarts knew well “the great task remaining” would be a long and
bloody affair but also an essential one.
Lincoln’s and Curtin’s references to soldier efforts undertaken “not in vain” recalled
biblical sacrifices, especially those of Christ. The common efforts of Christ and soldiers to save
mankind were drawn from passages such as: “if righteousness come by the law, then Christ is
dead in vain.” Salvation was delivered through sacrifice and, in turn, salvation initiated “a new
birth of freedom.” 69 In order for a society based in personal liberty and nationalism to endure,
that society needed to redefine itself. 70 In the Union’s case, to preserve was to create anew. 71
Lincoln achieved this goal through political and oratorical means; and Curtin followed suit.
“[S]urely the nation that has provided all of this,” the governor argued, “is destined to come out
of the contest purified, and as with a new birth, to march onward in the fulfillment of her
destiny.” 72
Fulfillment of that obligation did not end at the cemetery’s dedication, which was only
partially completed when Lincoln spoke. Months of work remained to accomplish the task. In
accordance with the plans agreed to during a December 17, 1863 meeting in Harrisburg
(including many of the governors who had met in Altoona the year before), the Soldiers’
National Cemetery was officially granted to the care of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
The state agreed to care for the grounds and graves in perpetuity in the name of all the northern
states that contributed to the care of the property. The meeting also requested that Pennsylvania
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establish a “corporation” of trustees composed of numerous governors and state officials in the
name of national and bipartisan unity. As of that winter, the cost for the removal of the dead on
the battlefield totaled $5,209.38. The estimated cost for completion of the cemetery was
$63,500—considered a small price compared to the one paid by the men buried on the grounds. 73
The efforts were tiring. Curtin’s fatigue continued well past his second inauguration on
January 19, 1864. Delivered to the state legislature, the speech was far less detailed and
grandiose than the address he delivered three years prior. Much had changed, including the
governor himself. His adherence to the Union was one aspect that had not been altered. He
pledged to his fellow leaders, “I will give my whole moral and official power to the prosecution
of the war.” For him, the preservation of the national life was “the first, highest, noblest duty of
the citizen; it is his protection in person, property, and all civil and religious privileges; and for
its perpetuity in form and power he owes all his efforts, his influence, his means, and his life.”
With rebellion’s potential to destroy the Union, “no real freedom can prevail, and no government
authority consistent with the genius of our free institutions can properly operate,” he said.
Ultimate victory required the people to “withhold no power which can strengthen the
government in this conflict.” To “wield the might of the government for its own preservation”
was the only way to achieve complete success and sustain “the valor of our troops.” 74
Curtin fully subscribed to Lincoln’s belief that to ensure the survival of democracy, “no
choice was left but to call out the war power of the Government.” 75 A fair government void of
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despotism that allowed free citizens “to have a fair chance in the race of life” was the liberal
dream—and the military was a major apparatus in securing that ambition. 76 The trick was to
foster a government neither too oppressive nor too powerless. As Lincoln admitted, “Must a
government, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties of its own people, or too weak to
maintain its own existence?” 77 In his first message to Congress, Lincoln referred to this
conundrum as the “inherent, and fatal weakness” of all republics. The fate of the republic in
question, however, rested largely in the deeds of its soldiers. Gettysburg proved that.

“Children of the Commonwealth”
Curtin’s liberalism was defined by a multitude of factors ranging from civic, economic, and
moral obligations to his constituents. In a variety of ways, his promotional support of Sanitary
Fairs hosted by the United States Sanitary Commission and United States Christian
Commission—predecessors of the American Red Cross—illustrated these commitments to
soldier care. The Great Central Fair beginning June 7, 1864 at Philadelphia’s Fair Buildings on
Logan Square was one of the largest such charitable events of the war. One newspaper coined
the event “A Grand Offering to Patriotism and Humanity.” 78 Like financier and philanthropist
Jay Cooke, Curtin felt the fairs were part of a higher calling. Cooke, for one, “crafted a classical
liberal understanding of patriotism, one in which the appetitive actions of self-serving
individuals would combine to produce the greatest public good.” This, in turn, fostered
“preeminent national loyalty” and patriotism. 79 By improving the state of the nation, soldiers
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sought to improve their own conditions in the game of life. This philosophy illustrated the hopes
and promises of American civilization. Working toward combined moral and civic betterment,
an 1861 educational journal proclaimed of the nation:
“The Union is the grand idea of Government . . . and the men that enjoy its
blessings should maintain their own rights under its authority, by respecting and
sustaining with a liberal spirit the rights of others. In the right of opinion,
protection, consists the freedom of the American citizen, and in the spirit of
toleration it would encourage, is to be found our security and the perpetuation of
our liberty.” 80
Ardently dedicated and devout, members of the commissions believed each individual soldier
determined his own fate and sanctification. Accepting the dual missions of God and country
would allow him to cast sin away and strive toward “moral perfection” within his nation and
himself. 81 By raising funds, comforting the physically and spiritually wounded, and grieving the
dead, the commissions helped to convey these testaments with great zeal and efficiency.
Curtin was drawn to these organizations for the same reasons Federal troops were. Like
other leaders present at the Great Fair, Curtin correlated the goals of the Almighty and the
Union’s soldiers as one in the same by declaring at the fair, “[L]et me dedicate this great building
to the American soldier, who wants no eulogium for his love of country but obedience to God.” 82
The efforts provided comfort amidst daily soldier grief and solacing as many of those same
soldiers neared death. To be reassured that the sufferings of they and fellow comrades truly
possessed meaning was perhaps the greatest consolation to those with mortal illnesses and
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wounds. 83 Such was happening on a daily basis as Union forces simultaneously slugged their
way through Tennessee, Georgia, and Virginia.
Though promising short remarks, Curtin could not help but praise “the private soldier of
the Republic,” denoting him as “the true nobleman of this land.” The governor went on to
reaffirm his own dedication to the common soldier in the name of the cause he struggled for.
“He falls with unrecorded name,” Curtin sadly but proudly boasted. “[H]e falls in the army for
small pay; no pageants mark his funeral; he is buried, perhaps, at Gettysburg, where there are a
thousand graves of the unknown. And while you minister comfort for him when he is sick and
wounded, pray, in God’s name, do not forget his wife and orphans when he falls.” Curtin again
asked his fellow northerners to place aside partisan discrepancies by “forget[ting] all differences
in politics, in sect, in caste, and religion, and declare for our bleeding and distracted country.” 84
With his last gubernatorial election behind him, partisan bickering became less a necessity.
Politicking aside, Curtin remarked to the legislature in an “Appeal” that the altruistic
undertakings of fairs across the nation were a true grassroots movement embodying the
unselfishness of citizenry: “Throughout the cities, towns, villages, hamlets, farm-houses of the
Commonwealth, are found the Heaven-directed-benefactors” who work tirelessly in the “holiest
of good works.” 85
The civic virtue Curtin and many citizens advocated formed societal spirituality in which
devotion to nation was second only to devotion to their Creator. Reverend Joseph Fransioli of
New York said as much in his July 1863 homily on patriotism by declaring, “patriotism is not
only a social virtue, commanding respect, but a Christian virtue, to be rewarded by the blessings
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of God, here and after.” The Federal dead of Gettysburg and other battles could not indulge in
the fruits of their own toil, but were justly delivered their heavenly rewards in the name of
humanity. 86
As Curtin knew, the cost of maintaining humanity was increasing at an alarming rate.
Ulysses Grant’s Overland Campaign began only a month earlier and became one of the bloodiest
military expeditions of the war. The day prior to Curtin’s oration, some 350 miles southeast of
Pittsburgh, the grim actions around Cold Harbor, Virginia commenced, inflicting an average of
over 1,000 Federal casualties per day for nearly two weeks. 87 Curtin, and Lincoln for that
matter, had no other option but to believe that the carnage was tragically worthwhile. As Henry
Ward Beecher noted, each individual death in the war could mean a thousand or more happier
lives in the future. Citizens sought meaning to the war to justify the extreme loss. 88 Curtin at
times feared the possibility of his own personal loss as well. The governor’s half-brother, John,
commanded a brigade of Pennsylvanians and New Englanders at Cold Harbor, surviving only to
be wounded in the shoulder later that month at Petersburg. 89
The misery continued for nearly another year. But when Curtin was informed of the fall
of Richmond in April 1865, he released a public proclamation stating, “Let us give Glory to the
Lord who hath given us the victory. The Republic is saved.” May Almighty God “look
favorably on us, and make us the Instruments to establish the Right,—to vindicate the principles
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of Free Government,—and to prove the certainty of Divine Justice.” 90 Union victory in 1865
ensured that a democracy of, by, and for the people could survive even amidst a conflict that
claimed well over 625,000 lives. A result of the struggle was a fusion of liberalism and
nationalism to the point that the ideologies became inseparable. 91 “We live in an age,” wrote
liberal intellectual and humanitarian Francis Lieber, “when the word is Nationalism, not
Denationalization.” Governance by consent represented dual fidelity between a country and its
people. 92 For Curtin, this wartime achievement only reinforced his personal tenets formed
during that war. A republic existed for its citizens, and vice versa. The war lent moral force to
the national senses of identity and purpose while simultaneously offering it broader definitions of
freedom at an institutional level. 93 Nationalistic liberalism forged by civil war successfully
nurtured the goal of a more perfected Union.
Efforts for the betterment of that society did not cease with the war’s conclusion. Having
championed the supremacy of the nation, Curtin focused many of his postwar efforts on social
reform and institutional change. In his annual message to the legislature in January 1866, Curtin
reflected, “During the last five years the people of the State have suffered deeply from the
calamities of war. Thousands of her men have been slain, and others are maimed and broken.
Almost every family has been stricken, and everywhere are the widows and orphans, many of
them helpless and in poverty.” 94
Curtin’s worries for the well-being of Pennsylvania’s youth were linked to his
Thanksgiving 1863 experience when two hungry orphans were found on the doorstep of the
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governor’s mansion. Upon further inquiry, Curtin discovered the fathers of the “two dirty,
ragged, shivering little beggar boys” were killed in the war and their impoverished mothers were
“utterly incapable of furnishing their daily bread” in the wake of family tragedy. The harrowing
thoughts of these unfortunates and ones like them haunted the governor. As one newspaper
paraphrased Curtin’s thoughts on the matter: “Was it possible that the people of Pennsylvania
could thank God [on Thanksgiving] for their victories, when the children of the brave men who
brought us the fruits of hard fighting, and carried our flag in triumph through the blood and
carnage of Gettysburg, were on the streets begging for bread!” In most instances, decrepit
almshouses were the only option of survival for beleaguered families. These homes, however,
often proved horrendous—serving as refuges for criminals, the mentally challenged, the poor,
and orphans—hardly better than prison. In few instances did these despondent tenants receive
the individual care they required. By transforming the almshouse into the singular method of
state-sponsored public assistance, many politicians of the antebellum era intended to shrink
government expenditures. The effects often led to the physical, moral, and mental decay of
almshouse inhabitants. 95
As one Philadelphia newspaper later reflected, “schools languished . . . . [T]he
organization of the system was a failure . . . the orphans were badly treated; and, if radical
changes were not immediately adopted,” the condition of education and welfare in the state
would continue to drastically deteriorate. The circulating rumors of squalor within orphans’
homes coupled with the overwhelming loss of fathers in the war prompted Curtin to action. To
do otherwise would have been “a scandal and disgrace,” one reporter surmised. 96
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Seeking a beneficial alternative to inundated almshouses, Curtin stated the “subject of the
relief of the poor orphans of our soldiers who have given or shall give their lives to the country
during this crisis” was of grave import. “I am safe in saying that at some period of each day,
until accomplished, [the matter] crossed my mind,” Curtin later reflected. 97 A nation based on
the liberal concept of gradual progression for the betterment of society required citizens to
promote compassion as much as they did economic success. In fact, the two motives correlated
with each other in Curtin’s perspective. The displaced youth of the 1860s possessed the potential
to become the entrepreneurs of the 1870s and beyond if they could only obtain sufficient
guidance in their upbringing. “In my opinion,” Curtin stated, the “maintenance and education
[of orphans] should be provided for by the State. Failing other natural friends of ability to
provide for them, they should be honorably received and fostered as children of the
Commonwealth.” 98 He earnestly recommended that the children be placed “into existing
educational establishments, to be there clothed, nurtured and instructed at the public expense.”
In doing so, he felt he represented “the wishes of the patriotic, the benevolent, and the good of
the State.” 99
The federal government played a major role in correcting many sanitary and social
conditions, but public health and well-being, especially of children, fell to the states. 100 Curtin’s
initiation of state-sponsored care merged moral motivations and practicality in the name of better
coordination and cost-effectiveness. Leaders in other states also nurtured the creation of military
orphanages, even in the South following the war. Advocate Theodore Sedgwick Gold, a leader
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in the quest to establish the Connecticut Soldiers’ Orphans’ Home demanded, “Spartan frugality
and severity be tempered by Christian philanthropy” in the name of mending the scarred youth of
the nation. 101 These institutions heralded by high-minded northerners were part of a widespread,
conscientious, and moral social movement that became the foundation of the modern child
welfare system in America. 102 While Curtin may have lacked the long-term foresightedness of
his initiative, the ramifications of his policies were profound for the state’s orphans.
Pennsylvania’s “very liberal law” provided the aid that few others could amidst the national
tumult. 103 Curtin’s revamped Whiggish sensibilities of contract merged the harmony of interests
with morality and “patriotic enterprise.” The result was the establishment of a charitable system
that operated as a living memorial while it also cultivated progress within society—the first such
institution in the world. 104
Lincoln also championed the cause in his Second Inaugural Address, expounding on “the
better angels of our nature” by asking Americans to show gratitude for “him who have borne the
battles, and for his widow, and his orphan.” 105 One school administrator campaigned to the
Pennsylvania Legislature for support by asking to “be just and liberal towards the bronzed
veterans who saved the nation’s life, and towards the children of those who fell in her defence.”
In doing so, they protected the nation from “foreign foes or domestic traitors.” 106 These free
institutions were deeply rooted in Curtin’s classical republican principle that the communal good
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of society was a byproduct of civic virtue. Traditional tenets of the time preached that youth
required educations to mold a sense of character that recognized communal well-being over selfinterests. Embracing the philosophies of educational reformer Horace Mann, the orphanages
encouraged “patriotic virtue, responsible character, and democratic participation”—all in the
name of perfecting the Union. 107
Historian Judith Giesberg may have best summarized the lofty goals of Pennsylvania’s
schools: with Civil War continuing to rage, aggressive proponents such as Curtin hoped that
“given an education and a trade, the children of poor soldiers might be rescued from poverty—
and that the nation, too, might be spared. Having sought to protect their own children from the
adult world, they sought to do the same for the children of the men who had died on the
battlefield.” Embracing liberal ideas in regard to labor and schooling, the institutions cultivated
skill, intelligence, and independence. These measures would help prevent the creation of the
unjust caste systems that gripped so many foreign lands. 108 The shared personal convictions of
students themselves can be seen in the individual case of Stanley Booz, a young man enrolled in
Pennsylvania’s system. Born into poverty, he had little chance for advancement but his father
nevertheless served and died to protect their “sacred liberties.” As Booz stated at one ceremony,
the orphans felt they had a stake in society; they viewed themselves as assets rather than burdens.
“[W]e expect to be able to earn our own livelihood,” he said, “and also to become useful citizens,
and honorable members of society.” 109 Politicians and educators were not merely growing
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young minds, they were growing democracy. 110 The schools thus “became nurseries of
patriotism.” 111
By the end of 1865, at least seventeen state orphanages were in operation throughout the
commonwealth, with additional sites overseen by other charitable organizations. Within three
years, over 3,700 children were enrolled in the various establishments. A great improvement
over the almshouses and asylums of decades past, the institutes strove to meet the needs of their
young inhabitants. As one newspaper reported in a lengthy feature article, “[g]ood health is
prevalent in all the schools. The death rate has been less than one to every three hundred and
fifty children per annum. . . . The devotion of the teachers and managers has been
unremitting.” 112 Schools were provided $150 per year per student enrolled and the children
performed songs and recited poems to the legislature to woo their financial support. 113 Curtin
viewed the orphan initiative as repayment but also as an investment by the commonwealth.
These children were part of the state’s—and the nation’s—future.
Less than three months after Curtin’s departure from the governor’s office, successor and
former Civil War general John White Geary advanced a bill in the state legislature allowing for
financial support of the orphanages in perpetuity. A provision in the bill permitted a student to
return to the care of family or friends on their sixteenth birthday if they chose not to enter the
apprenticeship provided for them. Upon departure, each orphan was supplied additional clothes,
a graduation certificate, and a detailed resume compiled by their principal explaining the
student’s qualifications and trade skills. Furthermore, the “wise and humane provision” directed
superintendent Colonel George F. McFarland “to procure schools or homes for the children of
110
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colored troops and sailors, subject to the same regulations and restrictions provided for orphans
of white soldiers and sailors.” As Philadelphia’s Daily Evening Bulletin marveled, this “distinct
system, providing for the especial care, maintenance and education of soldiers’ orphans
exclusively at the expense of the Commonwealth, was known to no nation or State prior to its
conception” in Pennsylvania. The law was later “liberally construed” to include orphans whose
fathers had passed away since the war’s end. 114 McFarland received letters on a routine basis
from instructors, statesmen, and philanthropists across the nation (including some in the South),
asking for details of Pennsylvania’s educational system for their own implementation. For these
successful results, the newspaper concluded, “we are indebted to the administration of Andrew
G. Curtin.” 115
Forms of relief for orphans and soldiers “had a mixed economy,” marked new territory,
and further merged social and bureaucratic endeavors into one. The conjoined components of
charity, education, pensions, and politicking increasingly disintegrated old borders between the
public and private spheres. 116 The war’s human costs resulted in the emergence of a new
nationalism, with the duties and obligations of state and federal governments arising in a
concerted effort to meet humane and patriotic demands. 117 Because of the widespread military,
civic, and philanthropic efforts conducted during the war, veterans and families were entitled to
numerous forms of public care frequently regardless of race, class, gender, or rank.
In her groundbreaking examination of social policy in America, Theda Skocpol states
recipients such as disabled soldiers and orphans “were made to feel worthy. These beneficiaries
114
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did not feel demeaned as if they were accepting ‘charity’ or ‘welfare.’ And they were not illregarded by their fellow citizens.” 118 In fact, such people were trumpeted as models of loyal
citizenry. “Were I to select any State interest which I would more warmly commend to your
prompt attention and liberality than another,” Curtin confessed to the legislature about the
schools in 1867, “it would be this.” 119
The liberalism of the Civil War era was thus about balance, an equilibrium between
people and state that ensured personal liberty and protection (economically and socially) while
also espousing the inviolability of Union. Citizens and government had a shared interest in each
other’s well-being. Citizenship secured the entitlement of key rights with the understanding that
privilege came with responsibility—including expectations of civic tasks and possible military
enlistment. 120 Curtin led Republicans in ensuring that this contract was something to be upheld,
even after military victory was achieved. Prior liberal notions of economic contracts gave way to
a renegotiated sense of partnership between constituents and government through offering
security, centralizing power, and inculcating an active sense of nationalism. 121
Following the war, he asked for the rentals of housing for soldiers in poverty until they
could secure “a livelihood by their labor.” He even conveyed much the same sentiment toward
the displaced children of United States Colored Troops. “Owing to the greater destitution and
want of information on the part of their relatives, the orphans of our colored soldiers may require
some special attention.” The governor requested the state superintendent of schools “to ascertain
their number and claims, and bring them into the schools that may be provided for them.” 122
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Educational initiatives such as these frequently sought to instill benevolent attitudes and social
conformity but also prepared the Negro for supposed enfranchisement, citizenship, and a degree
of autonomy—all of which would wishfully benefit African Americans and Republicans
simultaneously. 123 Still, other humanitarians were motivated by a cultural nationalism in which
leaders sought to accomplish their visions of an “enlightened republic” devoid of the tyranny that
had long plagued individual advancement in Europe. 124 All the Union’s facets: the “government,
the educational system, free-enterprise capitalism, and a host of other American features
institutionalized liberty. They were liberty’s bulwarks.” 125
On November 20, 1866, just a day past the third year anniversary of the nearby Soldiers’
Cemetery’s dedication, Gettysburg’s National Orphan’s Homestead was inaugurated on
Cemetery Hill, only yards away from the burial ground where many of the orphans’ fathers
eternally rested. Rev. Dr. Charles A. Hay of Gettysburg’s Lutheran Theological Seminary was
among the numerous dignitaries in attendance of the opening ceremonies, offering a closing
benediction. Hay “spoke of the prominence of Pennsylvania in these [charitable] enterprises,
and referred to the fact that Gov. Curtin pledged” to all his soldiers “that their families would be
cared for in their absence, and the orphans of such as well would be taken charge of an educated
as the wards of the State.” The Homestead, Hay continued, was “one of the fulfillments of that
pledge.” Community and national leaders such as Hay and Curtin entrusted responsibility to
commoners that “their liberality, their sympathy, and their prayers” would sustain such noble
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institutions not merely to ensure the proper upbringing of disadvantaged youth, but undertaking
as much as a monument to their deceased fathers. 126
The year of Curtin’s departure from the governor’s office, the annual operating budget of
the orphanages neared a half-million dollars—a sum of money the legislature was sometimes
hesitant to offer in full. 127 But the initiative had progressed so far in so relatively short an
amount of time. Youth relief was a moral obligation and a fiscal convenience. Reducing the
need for poor houses as a result “lessen[ed] the burden of government” rather than enflamed
it. 128 But many remained more pleased with the humane satisfaction over the monetary savings.
As one Curtin colleague later wrote:
“The amount of good that has been done by instilling higher and more intelligent
ideas of living into these children, many of whom must otherwise necessarily
have fallen into the lower strata of society and become an expense, if nothing
worse, to the State, cannot be measured by any mathematical calculation. They
have been saved by the State, and for the State, and they bid fair to leave a good
impression upon its citizenship.” 129
Over 650 orphans joined Curtin in a Fourth of July parade at Independence Hall in 1866. A
correspondent with the Philadelphia Inquirer rightfully referred to them as “the Children of the
Commonwealth.” 130 Public appearances by orphans were meant to serve as a reminder of the
holy obligation citizens had to the common good and their common responsibilities to society. 131
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Following in Lincoln’s footsteps, Curtin believed the Union to be a national compact by
and for the people—especially the soldiers and families who had offered so much in its name.
The burials of the honored dead, the care for their widows and orphans, and the attention for the
wounded garnered much praise and affection for their state leader. Pennsylvania’s combatants
gratefully recognized his actions for decades to follow. At one Pittsburgh veterans’ convention
following the war formally resolved: “[T]he soldiers of Pennsylvania recognize no warmer or
truer friend than Governor Andrew Gregg Curtin. His name is our watchword; his fame our
hope, and his merit our glory. The unswerving love of the soldier’s friend will be reciprocated
by their unfaltering devotion.” 132 The governor could have asked for nothing better. The
soldiers’ admiration for Curtin rested not solely in his persona, but his embodiment of a system
to which Federals expressed devotion and received reward for the noblest of deeds.
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Conclusion
The Path to Union
Andrew Curtin’s relief upon Union Victory in April 1865 was not savored very long. Only five
days after Lee’s capitulation at Appomattox, Abraham Lincoln became one of the war’s final
fatalities when an assassin’s bullet claimed his life. Shocked and enraged, the governor sought
reprisal against “the savage treason of assassins” who stole his president’s life at perhaps his
greatest hour. 1 Curtin released a notice for a reward of $10,000 for John Wilkes Booth’s
capture. 2
Curtin’s anxieties were multiplied by searching for Lincoln’s killer while simultaneously
hosting the president’s funeral procession in Harrisburg. En route to the city, Lincoln’s funeral
train halted at the Mason-Dixon Line on the afternoon of April 21, when a somber “Governor
Curtin, though very ill, having been confined to his bed for several days, proceeded to the State
border” to join his late Republican leader on his final journey. Much like his soldiers who
preceded him in death, Lincoln’s execution was likened to that of Christ’s. The ceremonies
initiated amidst “a perfect stream” of a black downpour. “Heaven wept even more than the
people,” Philadelphia’s Daily Evening Bulletin reported of the conditions in Harrisburg.
“Everywhere the flag is wreathed in crape. With a unanimity which has never been equaled, our
citizens have shown their high regard for the honored dead in every expressive mode.” 3 In this
respect, Curtin was inclined to agree. Less than two months after Lincoln’s death, the weary and
gray governor greeted returning Pennsylvania troops in the state capital, acknowledging, even
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“over the grave of the martyred Lincoln the power of his great office passed to his constitutional
successor so gracefully that we scarcely felt the transition.” 4
Those in the audience were likely aware of the meaning within their governor’s message.
The United States not only endured a ravaging internal war but revealed its true colors and
highest ideals on behalf of its people and its own survival. Even with Lincoln’s untimely
demise, the succession of Andrew Johnson to the presidency demonstrated that the Constitution
and the cherished rule of law had prevailed despite the cost. “Strange, (is it not),” Walt Whitman
agreed, “that battles, martyrs, agonies, blood, even assassination, should so condense—perhaps
only really, lastingly condense—a Nationality.” 5 As with the Union’s combatants whose lives
were cut tragically short, northerners attempted to assuage the anguish of Lincoln’s death by
promoting him as the final lost exemplar of the ultimate crusade for mankind. In the years
following his governorship, Curtin attempted to maintain the moral ties that had categorized he
and Lincoln’s shared struggles.
While Curtin’s party affiliation eventually changed, his convictions largely did not. At
the 1868 Republican Convention in Chicago, he was suggested as Ulysses S. Grant’s vice
presidential candidate. But with Pennsylvania considered safe in the Republican electoral
column, Curtin was passed over in favor of Schuyler Colfax of Indiana. In hindsight, Curtin may
have been grateful for the disregard. As a consolation prize, Grant appointed the former
Pennsylvania governor as Minister to Russia. Despite his diplomatic success there, the harsh
weather of Russia was not suitable for Curtin’s still-frail health, forcing him to leave in 1872.
The diplomat was not pleased with his Republican Party upon his return to America.
Frustrated by the seemingly spiteful desires of radical Republicans and the power of nemeses
4
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Thaddeus Stevens and Simon Cameron, Curtin associated himself with the Liberal Republicans
and soon became a Democrat. As one writer later noted, he “desired a more liberal policy in the
treatment of the southern states” following the war—a treatment calling for reconciled
nationalism rather than the retribution sought by the likes of Thaddeus Stevens. 6 One clergyman
in Curtin’s hometown noted in a postwar address, “We are saying to our misguided countrymen
who attempted to destroy it—lay not again your hands upon this precious heritage to rend it
asunder—this can only be done at the price of blood.” 7 The ex-governor felt exactly the same
way. Stirring the political hornets’ nest in the South could only undermine the Union’s victory
and delay its promises.
Furthermore, many moderates felt “that freedpeople seemed to mimic disaffected
laborers who refused to work on their own success.” If Radicals had the power to create an
“interventionist government that redistributed wealth,” liberal beliefs in the individual’s will to
determine his own destiny would be forever compromised. Middle-of-the-road Republicans
feared that economic initiatives granted to freed slaves would deny economic success to equally
hard-working white laborers. 8 Given Curtin’s advocacy for the protection of white labor, this
political situation may have been a factor in the change of his party allegiance. Whereas
Radicals sought all-encompassing rights for emancipated slaves, moderates possessed a less
universal perspective that promoted African Americans seeking contracts for their labor while
working and competing equally on a basis of merit. 9 Curtin likely felt that if a black American
could prove himself on the battlefield with his own fortitude, he could do the same in a free
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market. But blacks could rarely meet prosperity on an even level with the presence of the Ku
Klux Klan and Jim Crow, factors that Curtin may have never considered.
In 1880, Curtin was elected to the House of Representatives as a Democrat. Regardless
of his party affiliation, Curtin attempted to maintain the policies dear to him during his
governorship. Assisting in revision of the state’s constitution years after the war, Curtin
incorporated the clause: “The Legislature may make appropriations of money to institutions
where the widows of the soldiers are supported or assisted, or where the orphans of soldiers are
maintained and educated.” 10 Curtin’s desire to cultivate progress at the individual level was a
trademark of his long career extending before, during, and after the war. All of these tasks were
undertaken with the “the hope of humanity” in mind, and thus the hope of the nation.
But in 1882, he delivered an impassioned speech in Congress pleading for “twenty year’s
suspension of [Chinese] immigration” out of his fears that white workers could not compete
against the cheaper imported labor. Curtin viewed Chinese immigrants much as he did
Confederates during the war: as having no loyalty to the Union, privileging old cultural rather
than new national ties. He asked of his fellow congressmen: “Do we prefer to have 100,000
Chinamen take the place of 100,000 American laborers, part and parcel of the body-politic,
owing allegiance to our Government, with the right of the ballot, insuring for their children our
free education, and with American hopes and aspirations?” Motivated by a remodeled sense of
Free Soilism and humanitarianism for “loyal” laborers, Curtin sought to limit the expansion of
immigration as he had slavery—yet in this case he blamed the workers themselves rather than
the system that oppressed them. 11 Unlike ex-slaves that had proved their mettle and loyalty in
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battle, the Chinese had yet to prove themselves worthy of civic rights or professions in Curtin’s
eyes.
Retiring after three terms in Congress, Curtin retired to Bellefonte and resided there until
his passing in 1894. Appropriately, the location of his final resting place is Union Cemetery.
Some thirty years earlier, on Independence Day 1865, Curtin had joined the maimed general
Oliver Otis Howard and commander George Meade at another cemetery for the cornerstone
dedication of the Soldiers’ National Monument at Gettysburg. There he stated, “This place will
forever be attractive; the statesman can here meditate on the sacrifices made for liberty and
civilization . . . and all can count here, the cost to this generation of maintaining the principles of
freedom, transmitted to us from our ancestors.” While cemeteries and memorials were necessary
forms of tribute, Curtin argued the fallen’s greatest gift to the people was the republic itself.
Their memory was “enshrined in the hearts of a grateful people” and such was “a monument that
needs no scroll,” he reflected. 12
Salvaging the concept of Union from abstraction, historian Gary Gallagher makes evident
that northerners perceived much more at stake in the war than the singular cause of slavery. The
peculiar institution was ingrained in nearly every facet of southern society, but for the average
northerner, Union was the all-encompassing factor of their existence. 13 Curtin believed the
Union and his liberalism illustrated the codependence the republic shared with its loyal
constituents. Permanent disunion ignited by the slavery debate threatened this civic covenant
and constrained the potential of the individual. Emancipation was necessary as an exigency of
war, but so too was it a moral measure undertaken partly for the alleviation of enchained slaves
and partly for the average Federal infantryman who sought to perpetuate the virtues of Union.
12
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To repay fighting men for their afflictions, the war’s aims required alteration over time. Through
this process, Curtin hoped once-deprived citizens could reach the potential deceased soldiers
themselves may have dreamed of. In an ideal sense, this liberalism promoted shared authority,
protecting the individual by protecting their government.
Meanwhile, the turbulent repercussions of war mandated the mending of hearts and
minds as combatants recovered from wounds and orphans were provided state-sponsored
educations. Through cooperation, rehabilitation, and cultivation, the liberal spirit embraced by
Curtin and fellow leaders effectively sanctioned the righteousness and justice extolled by the
Union. The end product was a strengthening of the government and its people through a
renewed partnership of mutual defense and independence.
Curtin’s own efforts in protection and defense were recognized in kind throughout the
following decades. Writer A. E. Watrous of Harper’s Weekly concluded in Curtin’s lengthy
obituary, none of the governor’s official titles “were as dear to him as that title of the Soldier's
Friend, conferred in those schools of his, conferred in a hundred camps and hospitals, from the
Shenandoah to the Red River of the South, [and] by thousands of Pennsylvania volunteers.” 14
His proactive policies ensured this admiration and more. As one scholar of the time noted, “the
manifest destiny of America demands Statesmen thoroughly liberal in spirit.” 15 Many voters of
Pennsylvania believed they discovered such a candidate in Andrew Gregg Curtin.
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